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PRIVILEGES IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
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The great Truste, betweene Man and Man, is the Truste of Giving
Counsell. For in other Confidences, Men commit the parts of life;
Their lands, their Goods, their Children, their Credit, some particu-
lar affaire; But to such, as they make their Counsellors, they
commit the whole: By how much the more, they are obliged to all
Faith and integrity.
-Francis Bacon
(Essays, XX, of Counsell)
In determining the extent to which disclosures made from clients
to attorneys are protected from revelation, the advantage lies with the
proponents of admissibility, as the question has traditionally been
viewed as one of evidence law. Opposition to the confidentiality of
such disclosures is based on the assumption that confidentiality
represents an exception to the principle that all evidence having
rational probative value should be admitted in a lawsuit. Therefore,
confidentiality of attorney-client communications has been termed a
"privilege." Whenever writers on evidence address themselves to
questions of admissibility, it is generally presumed that the greatest
societal need is that all evidence should be placed before the trier of
fact. Dean Wigmore, for example, after excellently refuting Bentham's
arguments against attorney-client confidentiality,' observed that:
Nevertheless, the privilege remains an exception to the general
duty to disclose. Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; Its
obstruction is plain and concrete .... It is worth preserving for the
sake of a general policy; but it is none the less an obstacle to
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the investigation of truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.2
The same philosophy is found in both the Uniform Rules of Evidence
and the Model Code of Evidence-all relevant evidence is admis-
sible unless specified persons or matters come within an exception or
privilege.3
This view has been applied to the attorney-client communication
and has -found favor with some courts. As the court observed in In re
Selser:4
Since it results in the exclusion of evidence, the doctrine of
privileged communication between attorney and client runs counter
to the fundamental theory of our judicial system that the fullest
disclosure of facts will best lead to the truth and ultimately to the
triumph of justice ...
In adjusting this conflict in policy our courts have uniformly
recognized that the privilege is not absolute, but rather an excep-
tion to a more fundamental policy. It is therefore to be strictly
limited to the purposes for which it exists.
Such views as to the nature of the "privilege" have resulted in limita-
tions upon its exercise with the result that often its underlying
purpose-as we will develop-is defeated.
It is submitted that the reverse is true: the admissibility of com-
munications between attorney and client is an exception to a more
fundamental policy that all communications between attorney and
client should be kept confidential. The Canons of Professional Ethics
provide that it is the lawyer's duty to preserve his client's confidences
subject to a limited privilege to disclose in certain instances.' Indeed
one court has defined the inadmissibility of such communications as
"only an echo of the canon's mandate."6 An attorney is liable to the
client for ijnproper disclosure of confidential information.7 Confi-
dentiality is one of the hallmarks of the legal profession. Since the
lawyer-client relationship precedes a lawsuit, on a prior tempore,
2 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2291 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Wigmorel.
3 See the discussion of this point in Morgan, "The Uniform Rules and the Model
Code," 31 Tul. L. Rev. 145 (1956).
4 15 N . 393, 397-398, 105 A.2d 395, 401 (1954).
5 See Canon of Professional Ethics 37. A duty takes precedence over a privilege
when both are possessed by the same person. See also the discussion in People v.
Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 458-60, 126 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1955).
I Application of Franklin Washington Trust Co., 1 Misc. 2d 697, 148 N.Y.S.2d
731 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
7 See, e.g., Lakoff v. Lionel Corp., 207 Misc. 2d 319, 137 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sup. Ct.
1955). See also the discussion in Drinker, Legal Ethics 131-139 (1953).
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prior jure approach, confidentiality would outweigh admissibility.
More significantly, it must be remembered that litigation is but one
aspect of the lawyer's role and quantitatively, a small one. Litigation
is necessary only insofar as it is the only way the client's rights can
be protected. The prime method of protection is by the giving of
advice as to conduct with a view toward preventing any litigation, and
in that relationship secrecy has always been considered to be of
great importance. Once it is realized that litigation forms but a small
part of the legal assistance furnished, we can look at attorney-client
communications in a more realistic light. We tend to place undue
emphasis on lost evidence as the result of inadmissibility rather than
on the policies fostered by the inadmissibility of certain evidence.'
As long as our society recognizes that advice as to matters re-
lating to the law should be given by persons trained in the law9 -that
is, by lawyers-anything that materially interferes with that relation-
ship must be restricted or eliminated, and anything that fosters the suc-
cess of that relationship must be retained and strengthened. The
relationship and the continued existence of the giving of legal advice
by persons accurately and effectively trained in the law is of greater
societal value, it is submitted, than the admissibility of a given piece
of evidence in a particular lawsuit. Contrary to the implied assertions
of the evidence authorities, the heavens will not fall if all relevant
and competent evidence cannot be admitted.
Therefore, if we can conclude that secrecy of communication is
necessary to foster successful attorney-client relationships, then that
secrecy should be encouraged, strengthened and preserved. An excep-
tion to the rule of secrecy should not be made to further the trial
of a lawsuit. Unless it can be shown that there is no need for secrecy
in the relationship, communications between attorneys and clients
should be inadmissible, and the admissibility of any communication
involving attorneys and clients should be determined with reference
to whether its admissibility will interfere with the successful operation
of that relationship.
It has been contended that where proof cannot otherwise be
made, the judge should have the discretion to permit the attorney-
client communication into evidence.' ° This suggestion proceeds on
8 See the discussion of this point in Louisell, "Confidentiality, Conformity and
Confusion," 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101, 110 (1956).
9 The preserve of giving legal advice is constantly being entered by accountants,
real estate brokers and practitioners of similar professions. Indeed, if we are to retain our
position as legal advisers, we should not be ready to abandon guarantees that we have
asserted to give persons who consult us because of our status as lawyers.
10 McCormick, Evidence § 91 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]; Jackson v.
Pillsbury, 380 111. 554, 576, 44 N.E.2d 537, 547 (1942).
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the assumption again that nothing could be more important than that
the trier of fact have the opportunity to hear all relevant evidence,
ignoring that other societal values, revolving around the effective
provision for legal advice, may be harmed by such disclosure.
The question then becomes: Why is secrecy necessary? Histor-
ically, it is said to have existed because of the "exalted" status of the
barrister and the "lowly" status of the solicitor. The privilege was that
of the attorney: the barrister was considered to be a "gentleman" and
thus could not be required to disclose confidences of those whom he
"assisted"; the solicitor was considered a "servant" and, based on
an analogy to the Roman law, the servant was not permitted to break
"fides" by disclosing what his "master" revealed to him in confidence.:"
However, the view has been advanced that even then the functional
basis of confidentiality was recognized. There may have been a desire
for confidentiality in other relationships as well; but it was decided
that the attorney alone needed full confidentiality to carry out his
function-a need was not present, at least to the same degree, in
other professions.'
Today, however, when the right to confidentiality is analytically
that of the client rather than the lawyer,' 3 the question must be
posed again: How do we know that secrecy is necessary in order to
maintain effective attorney-client relationships? The answer is to
be found on the basis of verifiable experience. Apparently lawyers
and judges feel that confidentiality is necessary based on what little
statistical evidence is available.' 4 We can verify this thesis by our
own experience as lawyers. We know from experience that people
assume that what they tell a lawyer will not be revealed to others;
indeed, the lawyer often encourages disclosures by assuring the client
that what is said is in confidence.
11 Radin, "The Privilege of Confidential Communications Between Lawyer and
Client," 16 Calif. L. Rev. 487, 490-493 (1928); McCormick, § 91; 8 Wigmore § 2290.
.2 See the discussion of this point in Nokes, "Professional Privilege," 66 L.Q. Rev.
88, 89 (1950).
13 8 Wigmore § 2290.
14 An excellent study was undertaken by the Yale Law Journal. See Note, "Func-
tional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the
Privileged Communications Doctrine," 71 Yale L.J. 1226 (1962). The makers of this
study interviewed a number of practicing attorneys and judges and solicited their views
on confidentiality. Today the historical "method of sociology," as discussed in Cardozo,
Nature of the Judicial Process (1922), by which judges gave their opinions as to the
effect of rules of law on societal interests, has been replaced to a large extent by the
employment of actual sociological and related data. To the extent that courts employ the
knowledge of the other disciplines within the framework of legal analysis, results are
more likely to accord with societal needs.
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The client says many things he otherwise would not say be-
cause he assumes or is told that what he reveals to the lawyer is
confidential. He probably is not thinking of the "attorney-client
privilege" as such, and may not even be contemplating litigation when
he comes to see the lawyer. People simply assume that what they tell
the lawyer is secret, and in fashioning legal rules we cannot ignore
that fact. The law in all its aspects must take account of how people
act and live; this is particularly true when their actions relate to
the role of the legal profession in giving legal advice. Further, the
client does not come into the office with a precise legal analysis of
his problem and all the relevant facts neatly catalogued. More often
than not the lawyer must elicit the information. To the extent that
the client is not assured of confidentiality, this process becomes more
difficult and the end result less effective.
If communications are not secret, this fact will eventually become
known. The lawyer's task of eliciting information necessary to
properly advise the client will become more difficult; more vital in-
formation will be suppressed. The result can only be the impairment
of the effectiveness of the lawyer in counseling the client which, in
turn, may result in needless litigation. It is difficult to see how the
layman's respect for the legal process will be furthered when the
lawyer is required to reveal in open court what was disclosed in the
privacy of the lawyer's office. The layman's belief that "what you
say can be held against you" would seem not to apply to what he
told to the party he expected to protect his legal rights. The courts
should be slow to disabuse him of this notion which goes to the
essence of sucessful attorney-client relationships.
In dealing with the attorney-client relationship, the courts and
the commentators should not ignore the view of the practitioners who,
after all, are the ones that must deal with the clients and on whom
society relies to furnish effective legal advice. A recent study was
undertaken by the Yale Law Journal to examine the practical opera-
tion of attorney-client confidentiality and to show its relationship to
other communications for which confidentiality was sought. 15 This
study was constructed in the best traditions of experimental juris-
prudence. The study, conducted on the basis of sound sampling
techniques, 6 concluded that (1) more than half of the laymen and
nearly three-fourths of the lawyers surveyed agreed that without
confidentiality full disclosure would be significantly deterred; and (2)
neither judges nor practitioners believed that the rule of confiden-
1 Ibid.
16 Ibid. The exact techniques are described at p. 1227, n.6.
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tiality seriously disrupted the administration of justice-indeed, only
five out of one hundred and forty-nine interviewed thought it had a
detrimental effect. While it is not suggested that one study provides
the conclusive answer, nonetheless, the reactions of both lawyers and
laymen are highly interesting to observe.
In speaking of the necessity for the privilege in practice, an
attorney observed as follows:
Some commentators have criticized the modern privilege as an
outmoded protection largely benefitting perjurers and an unworthy
obstacle to truth-seeking. . . . Indeed, Professor Morgan has
strongly hinted that the ALI's Model Code preserves the privilege
only as a political concession to the organized Bar. . . .Morgan
seems to rest his reasoning on (1) a doubt that the privilege ac-
tually stimulates confidences, and (2) a suggestion that at least
in civil matters there can be no legitimate motive for a client to
wish information to be kept secret.
Argument (1) is of course a question of fact. Yet it is a rare
lawyer who has not personally experienced the need for coaxing
information from reticent or bashful clients. Whether or not the
privilege assists in this process it seems likely that the attorney
would pursue his inquiry with less vigor if he anticipated that he
himself might be called as a witness. Argument (2) is really the
nub of the matter, for there can be no doubt that the privilege
sometimes seems to protect one who has done wrong. Yet, if the
privilege were abolished, would there be any lasting improvement?
Would not the very people who should be unmasked be able to
find lawyers who could keep their confidences to themselves?
It seems to this writer that the true subjects of the privilege
are the clients who are in the common position of not really
"knowing" the facts because they do not understand the signifi-
cance of what they think they saw or now remember. It is pre-
cisely because the facts are subtle, elusive, and often unknowable
that counsel (in civil as well as criminal cases) is expected to show
them in their best light, just as his adversary has the task of
putting them in their worst. The entire process of cross-examining
one's own client in camera, of finding and presenting facts whose
exact contours may never be known, is in our society a vital
aspect of legitimate partisanship.' 7
The Yale survey indicates that similar views are shared by many
other members of the practicing bar. Their counsel should not be
discounted, as it is they who must administer the rules which courts
set and commentators propose.
This philosophy of the need for confidentiality was also articulated
by the drafters of the Model Code of Evidence. In justifying the
cprivilege" they observed as follows:
17 Simon, "The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations," 65 Yale
L.. 953, 954 n.6 (1956).
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In a society as complicated in structure as ours and governed by
laws as complex and detailed as those imposed upon us, expert
legal advice is essential. To the furnishing of such advice the
fullest freedom and honesty of communication of pertinent facts
is a prerequisite. To induce clients to make such communications,
the privilege to prevent their later disclosure is said by the courts
and commentators to be a necessity. The social good derived from
the proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for
their clients is believed to outweigh the harm that may come from
the suppression of the evidence in specific cases.ls
Since secrecy is necessary in order that the attorney-client relation-
ship function and operate properly, and since our policy favoring the
effective functioning of a system of legal counsel in all its aspects is
greater than the policy favoring the admissibility of a particular
piece of evidence in a lawsuit-only one aspect of the legal process
-attorney-client confidentiality should be preserved, and few, if any,
exceptions should be made when such a communication is sought to
be introduced in a lawsuit.
However, it is contended that such confidentiality in a lawsuit
is harmful to the administration of justice. Let us examine the
nature and extent of such harm and ascertain whether the harm is
so great that confidentiality should be abolished even at the price of
inhibiting the successful operation of the attorney-client relationship.
Let us consider the main arguments that have been made against
permitting confidentiality in a lawsuit.
One is that confidentiality in a lawsuit encourages litigation,
since if a lawyer refuses to take a case because the client is not entitled
to relief on the basis of the facts he presented, the client will consult
a less scrupulous lawyer or tell another lawyer a different story. The
"lips of the first lawyer are sealed" so goes the refrain, with the
result that another lawsuit will occur; moreover, it will be one where
perjury and fraud are practiced and the first lawyer cannot be called
upon in court to show that the client is now telling a different story
than he told the first lawyer.: 9
This argument presupposes that the vast majority of people
will go to another lawyer and tell him a different story. There is no
evidence that people will do so, and it is quite unlikely that too many
will. The honest person will either trust the lawyer to whom he went
or consult another lawyer to make sure, but it is doubtful if he will
appreciably alter the facts. We assume that most people tell the truth
18 Model Code of Evidence rule 10, comment a (1942).
19 See discussion in Radin, supra note 11, at 493; McCormick § 91; Morgan,
Forward to the Model Code of Evidence 24, 26 (1942).
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and that for those who don't, the threat of perjury is sufficient. We
must remember that the client will be cross-examined in civil cases
as to the actual facts. If cross-examination and the threat of perjury
are effective, the truth will come out at that time. The "sure truth"
by having the first lawyer testify seems a questionable benefit in
view of (1) the small number of cases where it will be necessary to
use him and (2) the fact that denial of confidentiality will potentially
affect every attorney-client relationship.
In regard to encouraging litigation, Professor Morgan observes
that "it is problematical whether lack of confidentiality will result
in useless litigation due to the client's failure to tell the whole truth,
but in any event it is outweighed by the unfounded litigation which
the privilege fosters."' He also states that if the client suppresses
pertinent information and no lawsuit results, there is no problem.
Apparently there is a problem only when the client asserts a ground-
less claim after seeing a second lawyer, because there he has been
lying. This ignores the probability of bad advice being given because
the client suppresses pertinent facts. The great majority of clients'
visits do not result in litigation. So even if there are more lawsuits
quantitatively, the harm caused by the increase in litigation would
clearly seem to be outweighed by the harm done due to improper
advice given in a multitude of situations because the lawyer does not
possess all the relevant information.
Moreover, where a fraudulent suit has been filed, there is nothing
to prevent the first lawyer from disclosing to the second lawyer what
the client told him. Although the matter is not specifically covered
by the Canons, since the client will presumably testify to untruths,
he would be committing perjury which is a crime, and which the
lawyer will reveal. In any event, the spirit of the Canon will not be
violated by the lawyer's disclosing information to another lawyer,
who is not permitted to disclose it either. We must assume that the
majority of lawyers will act accordingly and refuse to prosecute the
fraudulent case. But, it may be asked, what of those who will not
refuse? The Bar, like any other profession, has unscrupulous members,
and it possesses the means to deal with them. If the communication
was not confidential, there would be the danger that lawyers would
"blackmail" clients. In answering this objection to denying confiden-
tiality, Professor Radin observed that the Bar can deal with disrepu-
table members.21 The same argument would apply in reverse. The
Bar can deal with members who take fraudulent cases. This is a more
20 Morgan, supra note 19, at 26-27.
21 Radin, supra note 11, at 493.
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effective device than requiring or permitting the first attorney to
testify, particularly in view of the inhibiting effect this would have on
all confidences.
Then there is Jeremy Bentham's classic argument that the
deterring of a guilty man from seeking legal advice is no harm to
justice while the innocent man has nothing to fear from full dis-
closure and will not be deterred because of non-confidentiality.2
Mutatis mutandis, basically the same argument has been made by
Professor Morgan.2 3 The inherent fallacy in this argument is that
the line between innocent and guilty cannot be drawn with such
precision as is suggested. Dean Wigmore has successfully rebutted
Bentham's contentions. 4 In the first place, particularly in civil cases,
there is obviously no hard and fast line between guilt and innocence.
Indeed, both parties may be morally innocent and each believe his
version of the facts is accurate. Each party may have something to
fear; moreover, a layman does not necessarily know which testimony
is damaging and which is favorable. He may fail to disclose some of
the latter as well as the former if he does not have the assurances of
secrecy. Wigmore points out that Bentham admitted that abstinence
from seeking legal assistance in a good cause is an "evil fatal to the
administration of justice." This admission defeats the logic of Ben-
tham's argument, since it can be shown that the "good cause" would
suffer from nonconfidentiality. In the criminal area the underlying
rationale of the privilege of self-incrimination is equally applicable.
It is no secret, as every layman is aware, that the privilege protects
"bad people." This is deemed desirable, so as to discourage the state
from relying on testimonial compulsion to prove a crime instead of
specific evidence of wrongdoing. The state should not be able to abandon
its duty to "hunt up evidence" by virtue of the fact that the accused
exercised his constitutionally guaranteed right to consult an attorney.
Dean Wigmore's refutation of Bentham's classic argument has never
been refuted in turn.
Finally, we must remember that today, in civil cases, the client
can always be called to testify as to the actual facts.2" All he cannot
be asked so far as we are concerned is what he told his attorney. The
jury may not believe his version of the facts. What opposing counsel
really desires is to have his attorney testify, because if he testified
against his former client, this will have a favorable impact on the
22 See the summary of the argument in 8 Wignaore § 2291.
23 See note 19 supra.
24 8 Wigmore § 2291.
2 5 Wigmore § 2291, at 554. See the discussion in Simon, supra note 17, at 955.
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jury-they are more apt to disbelieve a client if his "own attorney"
testifies against him. The fact that the former attorney could contra-
dict his client and the "truth" become known is a dubious benefit in
view of the necessity for confidentiality. Opposing counsel's inability
to "shake" the client on cross-examination or to introduce other
evidence should not be compensated for at the price of impairing the
attorney-client relationship. We must assume that "truth" can be
discovered without violating attorney-client confidences.
Therefore, it is submitted that the danger from permitting confi-
dentiality is slight and clearly outweighed by the benefits of confiden-
tiality. The rule should be one of inadmissibility with no or few ex-
ceptions thereto, rather than favoring admissibility with the exception
of the attorney-client privilege. However, the underlying rationale
of confidentiality must be considered in determining whether the
communication is inadmissible in a particular situation. The rationale
is that confidentiality is necessary so that the client will not be deterred
from communicating any information to the attorney. The test in
determining whether a communication is inadmissible in a particular
instance is whether the failure to recognize confidentiality in that
instance would have an effect on the feeling of security in disclosure
that results from secrecy: Would the client have been likely to have
made the particular communication if he had reason to believe it
would be divulged? In other words, would the client be inhibited from
disclosing the facts if he had reason to believe that the communica-
tion was not confidential; were the circumstances such that the
client would be deterred or inhibited from disclosing the facts? It
is submitted that the substantive questions of admissibility must be
answered in light of this test. We will now proceed to examine the
substantive law and determine how it comports with this criteria.
In doing so we will review the present state of substantive law.
I. TiE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
1. Who Possesses the Right to Assert Non-Admissibility
It is now well-settled that the client may assert nonadmissibiity
on the ground that the evidence involves a confidential communica-
tion to an attorney, even when he is testifying as a witness.20 The
client may also assert it when he is not a party to the lawsuit by
interposing objection in court.2 7 An assignee has been held to have
authority to waive the confidentiality. 2 By the same token it would
26 See, e.g., Shelly v. Landry, 97 N.H. 27, 79 A.2d 626 (1951).
27 See, e.g., Ex parte Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E.2d 388 (1943).
28 Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950). See also the
discussion in 8 Wigmore § 2328, at 639.
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seem that he would have authority to assert confidentiality. The
interest he purchased includes various things, one of which would
be the confidentiality of certain communications disclosed by his
assignor. While there is no question of deterrence here, nonetheless,
the right of silence is an asset which the client has transferred and
those principles justify the assignee's assertion. Upon the client's
death his personal representative may also assert confidentiality.29
The attorney may assert it on behalf of the client where the
client is present and a party.30 Under Canon 37 he has a duty to
assert it even when the client is not a party nor present and, of course,
has the power to do so." The interesting question arises as to whether
a lawyer can refuse to answer when the court has erroneously held
that he must testify to a communication he claims was made to him
by a client in confidence. In other words, the attorney claims that
the court has erroneously denied his claim of attorney-client com-
munication. If the client is a party, it has been held that the attorney
must answer even if the claim was erroneously denied or be held
in contempt. 2 This is because the error, if any, can be rectified on
appeal if his client loses; theoretically, his client has not been harmed
if he prevails. The possibility of reversal on appeal justifies the
requirement of compliance. There can be no question of inhibition,
since the attorney is trying to protect the communication and if
erroneously denied to the client's detriment, the appellate court will
reverse and the confidentiality will not be breached again. But the
more difficult problem arises when the client is not a party with the
result that no one has standing to appeal-the party against whom the
evidence is introduced cannot appeal, since the evidence is competent. 33
If the attorney asserts the confidentiality on behalf of his client, but
the court orders him to testify, what course of action should he
take? Professor McCormick says he should submit. He has done his
duty by calling the confidentiality to the attention of the trial judge;
therefore, if he refuses he should be held in contempt even if the
trial judge was in error.34
Some lawyers, however, take a different view of their duty under
Canon 37 and are more concerned with protecting attorney-client
29 See, e.g., Martin v. Shaen, 22 Wash. 2d 505, 156 P.2d 681 (1945).
30 See, e.g., Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); People v.
Morgan, 140 Cal. App. 2d 796, 296 P.2d 75 (1956).
31 See the discussion of this duty in State v. Toscano, 13 N.J. 418, 424, 100 A.2d 170,
172 (1953).
32 Ex parte Lipscomb, 111 Tex. 409, 239 SA. 1101 (1922).
33 See, e.g., Schaibly v. Vinton, 338 Mich. 191, 61 N.W.2d 122 (1953).
34 McCormick § 96.
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confidentiality. If such a lawyer is committed for contempt, can he
obtain release on habeas corpus on the ground that he was not re-
quired to answer the question for the refusal of which he was com-
mitted? This was the situation in Elliot v. United States,35 where the
court held that since the question was improper, the court could not
inquire about the matter and its contempt order was void. Such an
approach is sound if we accept the proposition that attorney-client
confidentiality is entitled to greater weight than this admissibility of
evidence. If the attorney feels that protection of the client's confi-
dence is so great that he is willing to risk imprisonment for it, his
conduct is commendable rather than reprehensible, particularly when
it turns out that he was right and the trial judge was in error.
Now let us consider the converse: the attorney testifies in a
lawsuit where his client is not a party and the party against whom
the testimony is introduced asserts the fact that the testimony refers
to an attorney-client communication. Here the attorney has been
permitted to testify. 6 This seems equally proper, since the attorney
is the guardian of confidentiality in the client's absence. He is the
one who is charged with the duty of maintaining confidentiality, and
if he believes the client would not object to disclosure here, he may
disclose. The matter is between him and his client and is of no
concern to the party against whom the evidence is to be introduced.
We must remember that such evidence is fully competent if no
objection is made by one whose interest is affected by the com-
munication.
2. What Constitutes the Relationship
Thus far we have been discussing the confidentiality of attorney-
client communications on the assumption that such a relationship has
been found to exist. We will now proceed to determine when in fact
such a relationship does exist so that what is said is confidential. The
relationship is deemed to exist for purposes of confidentiality when-
ever negotiations are commenced; it is not necessary that the attorney
actually accept employment.3 7 This is sound, as the client must tell
the attorney the facts before the attorney decides whether he wishes
35 23 App. D.C. 456 (1903).
36 State v. Snook, 93 NJ.L. 29, 107 Ad. 62 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 94 N.J.L. 271, 109 At. 289 (E. & A. 1920); State v. Kump, 76 Wyo. 273,
301 P.2d 808 (1956).
37 Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1890); Smale v. United States, 3
F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 602 (1925); In re DuPont's Estate, 60
Cal. App. 2d 326, 140 P.2d 866 (1943); Shong v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank,
70 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1955).
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to accept the retainer, and the client assumes confidentiality as soon
as he talks to the lawyer. As indicated previously, it is not necessary
that the advice be sought in connection with a lawsuit, as more fre-
quently than not, persons consult lawyers with a view toward avoiding
future litigation.3 However, it is not created by the attorney's sug-
gestion that he give legal advice, which suggestion is rejected. In
Burton v. McLaughlin," the attorney was a friend of the decedent
and in conversation suggested sua sponte that the decedent add a
codicil to his will, which suggestion was immediately rejected. Sub-
sequently the attorney was permitted to testify as to what the decedent
said and did at that time. Here the decedent was not consulting him at
all and under our rationale was not inhibited in telling him things
that he would only tell an attorney. There is no relationship until
the client indicates a desire to establish one. The same reasoning
limits confidentiality to communications made after the relationship
has commenced. The mere fact that an attorney later represents a
party does not imbue what was told to him prior to the time the rela-
tionship existed with any confidentiality. At the earlier time, the client
did not consider him as his attorney.4
The relationship exists when the client reasonably believes the
party is his attorney, though in fact he is not. In Foster v. Buchele,41
the plaintiff had consulted with the defendant's attorney while plain-
tiff and defendant were negotiating. The attorney decided to represent
the plaintiff, but did not successfully communicate the fact to the
defendant. It was held that what the defendant told him subsequent to
the time that the attorney believed the relationship had terminated
was confidential, since the client did not believe the relationship had
terminated. The same feeling of security is present on the part of the
client irrespective of whether the attorney believes the relationship
has terminated, justifying confidentiality. However, where the client
attempts to entice away the other party's attorney, what he tells
that attorney is not entitled to confidentiality. 4 There the client has
no reason to assume that what he tells his opponent's attorney in an
38 See the discussion of this point in 8 Wigmore § 2295, at 566.
39 117 Utah 483, 217 P.2d 566 (1950).
40 Knox v. Knox, 222 Minn. 477, 25 N.W.2d 225 (1946). This involved an action to
declare a constructive trust in property conveyed by the husband to the wife. The
attorney had first represented the husband and at that time was informed of the
matter to which he subsequently testified. Later he represented the wife in proceedings
connected with the property. Obviously the wife was not relying on confidentiality at
the time the communication was made.
41 213 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
42 Wigmore treats this as a communication designed to perpetrate a fraud and
would deny confidentiality on that ground. 8 Wigmore § 2312, at 609.
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attempt to entice him away will be confidential; he is taking a risk,
"going into the lion's den," so to speak. On that basis, there is no
reason to treat what he said as confidential, as he was in no way led
to disclosure under assurances of confidentiality. Rather he would
guard what he said with the awareness that the attorney might not
decide to "switch."
The next question is whether the relationship can exist for
purposes of confidentiality if the recipient of the communication is
in fact not an attorney, but the client reasonably believes that he is.
Many cases have held such communications confidential, 43 and both
the Model Code" and the Uniform Rules45 recognize that a commu-
nication to such a person is confidential. Obviously communications
to those persons should be treated as such. If a party holds himself
out as an attorney, the client cannot be expected to investigate whether
he was admitted to the bar! The client must rely on outward appear-
ances and the assurances that the state will not permit persons to
practice law without a license. Since the client makes the commu-
nications under an implied assurance of secrecy, confidentiality should
attach even though the client was reasonably mistaken.
The relationship is deemed to exist as to communications the
insured makes to his insurer.4  The insured considers the insurer
his agent for purposes of litigation; that is, the insurer must obtain
the attorney and the insured assumes that what he tells the insurer
will be transmitted to the attorney. Since he does not engage the
attorney directly, the insurer is his conduit to the attorney and he
assumes that what he tells the insurer is the same as what he tells
the attorney. Therefore, the underlying rationale justifying confi-
dentiality is applicable. On the other hand, a factual situation may
arise where the party making the statements to an insurer is not
entitled to rely on assurances of confidentiality. In Haskell v.
Siegmund,47 an employee was using an automobile of the insured
employer and was involved in an accident. The insurer claimed that
he was not required to defend under the terms of the policy. Both the
insured and employee made statements to him in an effort to persuade
him that he was liable. Under those circumstances they could not
43 See, e.g., People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277, 27 N.W. 539 (1886). See also the
discussion in 8 Wigmore § 2302, and cases cited n.1.
44 Model Code of Evidence rule 210 (1942).
45 Uniform Rule of Evidence 26.
46 Vann v. State, 85 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1956); Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 2d 821,
87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St.
305, 98 N.E.2d 840 (1951).
47 28 I1. App. 2d 1, i70 N.E.2d 393 (1960).
[Vol. 24
ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENCES
assume that the insurer was their agent to transmit the statements
to an attorney for a trial on the merits. The issue was whether he
would so transmit statements, and the parties were not entitled to
rely on confidentiality until that issue was determined. There was no
indication that the statements would ever reach a person who would
be the attorney for the insured and the employee.
Confidentiality is not applicable to communications made to a
judge in private,4 the public prosecutor,49 or a grand jury50 on the
basis of the attorney-client relationship. This is not to say that
these communications may not be privileged under some other theory,51
but they cannot be privileged under the theory that they were made
to an attorney for the simple reason that the persons to whom the
communications were made, were not the attorneys of the person mak-
ing the communication. If the party thinks that what he is saying is
confidential, it is not because he is telling it to his lawyer. Denying con-
fidentiality here does not run counter to the underlying rationale
justifying confidentiality of communications between attorney and
client.
The next question is to what extent confidentiality exists as to
communications made to counsel for a co-defendant. The result
seems to depend on whether the parties were conducting a joint defense
and this distinction is sound. Where, for example, one defendant was
indicted for receiving stolen goods and the other defendant for larceny,
it was held that statements made to the attorney for the co-defendant
were not confidential.52 The parties were not preparing a joint defense,
and it was counsel for the first defendant that requested the conference
at which the statement was made. But where a joint defense was
planned, statements made to the attorney for the other defendant were
held to be confidential. 3 The cases denying confidentiality emphasized
that no joint defense was planned. If there is no joint defense, the
client has no reason to believe that what he tells the attorney for the
48 Pritchard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 339 U.S. 974
(1950).
49 State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 164 A.2d 399 (1960).
Go United States v. H.J.K. Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 969 (1957).
51 Thus, in People v. Pratt, 133 Mich. 125, 94 N.W. 752 (1903), the court held
that statements made to a judge were entitled to confidentiality. Although the court
talked in terms of "attorney-client" privilege, it was clear that the decision was based
on policy grounds relating to the role of judges.
52 Vance v. State, 190 Tenn. 521, 230 S.W.2d 987 (1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
988 (1950).
53 Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 1036 (1871). This case was thoroughly dis-
cussed and distinguished in Vance v. State, supra note 52.
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co-defendant will be kept secret. Confidentiality extends only to com-
munications from client to his attorney. Where there is a joint defense,
the attorney for the co-defendant is working with the client's attorney,
and a defendant assumes that what he tells his co-defendant's attorney
will be entitled to the same confidentiality as what he tells his own
attorney. Frequently they will be holding joint conferences, and it
would be anomalous if the attorney for the other party could each
testify as to what the other's client said. Where there is no joint
defense, the co-defendants may well be partly adversary. One de-
fendant has no reason to believe that an attorney for a co-defendant
is concerned with his case; therefore, he is not entitled to rely on
assurances of confidentiality when he reveals things to the co-defend-
ant's attorney.
As to practitioners before administrative agencies, e.g., patent
agents, it is clear that if the party to whom the communication is made
is a member of the bar, the relationship of attorney-client exists even
though non-lawyers practice before the agency.5 4 As to non-lawyers,
some cases have denied them the status of attorney for purpose of
confidentiality, even though they are admitted to practice before
the agency.5  Dean Wigmore has argued that the relationship should
exist between administrative practitioners and clients. He has pointed
out that the client must confide in an administrative practitioner the
same as an attorney who practices before such an agency.5 Moreover,
these persons are admitted to practice before the agency in much the
same manner as attorneys are admitted before a court. The real thrust
of the argument is that the client may well not know whether the
administrative practitioner is actually admitted to the bar; it is
sufficient for his needs that he is admitted to practice before the
agency. With the increase of administrative agencies and the role
played by lawyers in the process, the client is entitled to assume that
what he tells the administrative practitioner has the same confidentiality
as what he tells an attorney in a case not involving administrative
agencies. The agency is dealing with legal rights and full disclosure
is as necessary here as in any other situation where legal rights are
54 See the discussion in Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 159
F. Supp. 917 (D.NJ. 1958).
55 See, e.g., Kent Jewelry Corp. v. Kiefer, 202 Misc. 778, 113 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct.
1952). The statute covering confidentiality referred to "attorney or counselor at law."
It was held to be immaterial that an oath was required of the patent attorney, since he
was not licensed by the state to practice. See also Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734
(5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953) (C.P.A. practicing before Treasury
Department and having the same duties as attorneys).
56 8 Wigmore § 2300a.
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involved. Because the client cannot draw the distinction between
practitioners admitted to the bar and those admitted only before the
agency, communications to both should be treated as confidential.
A number of questions as to the existence of the attorney-client
relationship for purposes of confidentiality arise because of the fact
that lawyers engage in a variety of activities that do not strictly involve
legal skills. It is a well-known fact that lawyers perform a multitude
of functions which can be performed by non-lawyers. The two most
common situations are where the lawyer acts as a "scrivener" and
where he acts as a "business adviser." The theory is that confidentiality
is applicable only when he is acting as a "lawyer" and not when he
is acting in another capacity, even though lawyers frequently act in
such a capacity.
It is "black letter law" that confidentiality does not attach when
the lawyer is acting as a scrivener. 57 The theory is that he is employed
only to put into legal form the agreement of the parties. His position
is no different than that of a real estate broker. But where the
attorney drafts a will, he is considered to be acting in his function as
an attorney and confidentiality attaches."' Where a real estate trans-
action is complicated, however, he is deemed to be acting as an
attorney, even though he also drafted the deed. Thus confidentiality
attached in Shelley v. Landry,9 where the grantor conveyed real
estate to himself and his daughter as joint tenants, having previously
sold the property and received back a long-term lease. The purpose
of the transaction was to destroy the rights of his estranged wife.
The court held that the client was consulting the attorney in his
capacity as legal adviser and not as scrivener.
It is submitted that it is impossible to distinguish between his
capacity as attorney and that as scrivener on the basis of whether or
not the transaction was complicated. The fact that the party goes
to a lawyer, knowing that he is a lawyer, rather than to a real
estate broker is evidence that he wants legal advice. Even though
the transaction is simple, the layman may think it is not and wants
the lawyer's assurances that it will be valid. It is not accurate to say
that the lawyer is merely embodying the intentions of the parties in a
writing, because it is implicit that if their intentions are unenforceable,
the lawyer will call this fact to their attention. It is desirable social
5" McCormick § 92; 8 Wigmore § 2297. For the use of "black letter law" in judicial
opinions, see Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 993 (1953); Cranston v. Stewart, 184 Kan. 99, 334 P.2d 337 (1959); Wilcox v.
Spoons, 359 Mo. 52, 220 S.W.2d 15 (1949).
58 8 Wigmore § 2297.
59 97 N.H. 27, 79 A.2d 626 (1951).
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policy that lawyers prepare deeds as well as wills instead of having the
parties go to a realtor or employ a "do-it-yourself" form.
More importantly the client knows he is going to an attorney and,
therefore, granting the rationale discussed earlier, believes that what
he tells the attorney is told in confidence; he does not have the same
belief when he has a real estate broker draft the deed. Of course,
if the client does not know the drafter is a lawyer, he is not consulting
him in that capacity and confidentiality would not attach by happen-
stance that the drafter is a lawyer. This principle was recognized in
Frierson v. Mississippi Road Supply Co.,"° where the court held that
confidentiality attached to a communication made to a lawyer drawing
up an apparently uncomplicated bill of sale. When a party consults
a lawyer to draft an instrument, confidentiality should attach regard-
less of the simplicity of the instrument even though such instruments
are also prepared by non-lawyers. Since the party chooses to have
a lawyer do the work, he is acting under the assumption that what
he tells the lawyer will be confidential; his state of mind is not affected
by the complexity of the instrument which the lawyer is preparing.
The same principles should be applicable when the lawyer is
acting in a "business capacity." There are basically two situations.
One is where the lawyer is acting as a business agent for purposes
of negotiations and the like. The other is where the lawyer is also
an accountant and performs work that could be performed by any
accountant, such as preparing tax forms. Again, the black letter rule
is that confidentiality does not attach since the attorney is acting in
a business, rather than a legal, capacity.0 1 The most common situation
is where the attorney is employed to negotiate with third parties,
usually for the purchase or sale of property or to collect rentals and
the like. Some courts will "blue-pencil," that is, hold confidentiality
applicable as to communications relating to "legal" matters, but
inapplicable as to those relating to "business" ones."2 Dean Wigmore
says that the court must look to the general purpose of the relationship
and ascertain if it involves advice as to legal rights. If it does, all
communications should be privileged even though a particular trans-
60 221 Miss. 804, 75 So. 2d 70 (1954).
61 Lowy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 262 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1959);
Comercio E Industria Continental v. Dresser Industries, 19 F.R.D. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Gallagher v. Akoff Realty Corp., 197 Misc. 460, 95 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
Twitty v. Harrison, 230 S.C. 174, 94 S.E.2d 879 (1956).
62 Myles E. Rieser Co. v. Lowe's, Inc., 194 Misc. 119, 81 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct.
1948). The court held certain portions of letters confidential and others admissible
depending on what aspect of the transaction was involved.
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action involves business purposes 3 He gives the example of a
revelation of the financial condition of a shareholder pursuant to a
proceeding to enforce a claim against a corporation, to which he says
confidentiality should attach.
It is submitted that the "business purpose" approach, whether
or not "blue-pencilling" is involved, is unrealistic. The test should
be whether the party was aware that the person he consulted was an
attorney and consulted him rather than another business adviser
because he was an attorney. The layman cannot separate "business"
from "legal." He may well want a lawyer to negotiate or collect the
rental or perform other business functions because of the possibility
of legal problems arising during the course of commercial transactions.
Since he considers the party as a lawyer, the rationale justifying
confidentiality is applicable. He confides things to an attorney-nego-
tiator that he would not confide to another because he assumes that
what he tells a lawyer is confidential. So long as it is recognized as
ethically proper for a lawyer to perform certain functions that could
be performed by laymen, the public is entitled to rely on assurances
that the courts will consider the lawyer a lawyer in all aspects and not
only in the ones defined as "legal." Where a party consults a lawyer
knowing he is a lawyer, he should be able to rely on confidentiality
in regard to what he tells that person. It is the status of the person
to whom the communication is addressed rather than the subject matter
of the employment, as long as it is work lawyers perform, that should
determine whether the communicant may consider what he says as
confidential.
As to the lawyer-accountant, it has also been held that there is
no confidentiality when the attorney performs work that could be
performed by an accountant, usually the preparing of tax forms.64 It
is known that many lawyers are also accountants and practice as both
where this is not prohibited. If the client consults an accountant,
where an accountant's privilege is not recognized, he is not entitled
to assume confidentiality by the happenstance that the accountant
is also a lawyer. But it is highly probable that many persons
want lawyers to prepare their tax forms in view of the complexity
of tax laws. Quite naturally, they would consult an attorney who
possesses the accountant's qualifications to prepare the form, but the
attorney's capacity to examine the legal problems that might arise.
When they are consulting an attorney, unless it appears that they
clearly are not consulting him because of the fact that he is an attorney,
63 8 Wigmore § 2296.
64 See the cases dted in notes 65 and 66, infra.
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they are entitled to assume confidentiality as would exist if they were
consulting him on anything other than a matter that could be handled
by an accountant. Sometimes, it is obvious that they are not con-
sulting him as an attorney, and hence there is no reason for confi-
dentiality to attach. In Olender v. United States,65 for example, the
accountant-attorney was hired to prepare a statement of net worth
and the tax returns. The client went to an accounting firm to secure
his services. More significantly, the defendant had another attorney
to whom the accountant-attorney went to secure legal advice as to
the returnl Here, it was obvious that he was not consulted as an
attorney and the client could not rely on assurances of confidentiality.
In Clayton v. Canada,6" the attorney testified that he made his living
as a certified public accountant and on that basis the court held
confidentiality did not attach. However, his office door read "attorney
at law." In the absence of evidence that the client did not consider
him an attorney, confidentiality should attach because the client was
entitled to rely on the fact that he was an attorney. So long as
attorneys are permitted to perform work that can be performed by
non-attorneys and there are legal questions that could arise in con-
nection with such work, it must be presumed that the client considered
what he disclosed to be confidential as would be any other matter he
told an attorney, and the courts should protect this assumption.
The final problem as to the nature of the relationship concerns
communications made to an attorney who is a personal friend of the
party making the communication. It is no secret that persons try to
obtain free legal advice from their attorney-friends. By the same
token, attorneys often furnish legal advice and services to their friends
with or without fee. The courts seem to find that statements were
often communicated to the attorney as a friend and hence confi-
dentiality does not attach. In Solon v. Lichtenstein, 7 for example,
the attorney had discussed transfer of cemetery lots, which was held
to involve legal advice. The client went on to discuss family arrange-
ments for the division of property upon his death. It was held that that
discussion bore no relationship to employment of the attorney and that,
therefore, confidentiality did not attach.6" And in Callahan's Estate,69
the attorney had drawn wills for husband and wife. On a social
visit they told him that they had destroyed the will for the purpose
65 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954).
66 223 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
67 39 Cal. 2d 75, 244 P.2d 907 (1952).
68 The court also noted that the decedent had discussed the matter with another
person, possibly constituting a waiver of confidentiality.
69 251 Wis. 247, 29 N.W.2d 352 (1947).
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of reinstating their earlier will to give less to their son who had begun
to drink heavily again. It was held that confidentiality did not attach
to that communication.
It is submitted that both cases were erroneously decided. The
relationship of attorney-client may be a continuing one and is not
rendered any less a relationship because the parties are also friends.
The parties assume that what they tell their attorney-friend as to
matters with which he has dealt is no less confidential than if they
revealed the matters to an attorney who was not a friend. We may
ask also whether they would have revealed the same matters to him,
even if he was their friend, if he was not a lawyer. At least where
there was a prior relationship between the parties, anything told the
lawyer-friend relating to those matters should be confidential. On the
other hand, requests for legal advice at cocktail parties would not
indicate that the communicant is relying on confidentiality. Again,
the basic test of whether the party revealed matters to the attorney
under such circumstances that he was entitled to assume that what he
said would be confidential, should suffice to determine when confi-
dentiality should attach.
3. The Corporate Client
With the increase of the corporate form of organization and the
employment of both outside and house counsel, confidentiality of
communications made by the corporate client must be considered
separately. The corporation, if it is sufficiently large, employs both
house and outside counsel, house counsel being an attorney or
attorneys who are employed on a full-time basis as any other corporate
employee. They are not kept on retainer, but receive a salary plus
other emoluments the same as any other employee.
Where a corporation consults outside counsel, the situation is no
different than when an individual consults such counsel, and it is
undisputed that confidentiality attaches.7" The question here is:
Who speaks for the corporation? That is, since a corporation can
only act through agents, what agents can be said to have authority
to act as the corporation in the sense that what they tell the attorney
is confidential in the same manner as an individual client? A proposed
test has been "whether the good that the privilege seeks to accomplish
-candor between client and attorney-would be defeated unless the
70 Stewart Equipment Co. v. Gallo, 32 N.J. Super. 15, 107 A.2d 527 (1954). See
also Uniform Rule of Evidence 26. However, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Ill. 1962), it was held that a corporation is not
entitled to claim the privilege.
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particular agent were permitted to speak for the corporation.""
Obviously an individual director and officer would have to have such
authority as he would be the party who legally has to act for the
corporation.72 These parties would qualify as managing agents. The
other type who would clearly have capacity to speak for the corporation
is a communicating agent; that is, one whose position requires him to
communicate information to the corporation's outside attorney. The
interesting question involves "source agents"; that is, lower-ranking
employees. The question of the extent to which their disclosures are
considered the revelations of the corporation is the same as that
regarding employees of an individual client and will be discussed sub-
sequently. A stockholder certainly cannot be said to speak for the
corporation; he is not involved in its operations and does not have
the status of agent.73 The test which would insure that at least
managing and communicating agents, but not stockholders, can speak
for the corporation is sound.
The real dispute in this area is whether communications to house
counsel should be confidential; that is, can house counsel or the parties
making the communication to him be required to testify as to those
communications? The courts have extended the requirement of con-
fidentiality to such communications and have held that what is told
to him is in the same category as what is told to an outside attorney.74
As one court has observed, "The type of service performed by house
counsel is substantially like that performed by many members in
large urban law firms. The distinction is chiefly that the house counsel
gives advice to one regular client, the outside counsel to several reg-
ular clients. ' 75 Where the privilege has been extended, it should not
be necessary that house counsel be a member of the bar in the
state where the communication was made, as many corporations do
interstate business, requiring him to act in many states. He is con-
sidered an attorney as long as he is admitted to the bar of one state.76
71 Simon, "The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations," 65 Yale L.J.
953, 956 (1956).
72 Id. at 957.
73 Id. at 966.
74 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960);
Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S-DIN.Y.
1956); Leonia Amusement Co. v. Lowes, 13 F.R.D. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
75 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra note 74, at 360.
76 Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., supra note 74. The
court observed that the corporation had offices in thirty-five states, with the result that
house counsel might have to spend most of his time taking bar examinations I
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However, confidentiality does not extend to communications
between other corporate officials who happen to be lawyers. It is
well known that many lawyers who start out in the house counsel's
office eventually leave that to assume other managerial positions.
7
Many of the corporate officials and directors are attorneys, then, and
many communications are made to them. In R.C.A. v. Rauland
Corp.,78 it was contended that such communications were entitled
to be confidential because made to an attorney. This contention was
rejected by the court. The court held it was impossible to distinguish
their business from legal functions and concluded that they had
received the positions as negotiators in an attempt to keep confidential
their negotiating activities, which were directed toward an illegal
conspiracy.79
It is submitted that the result can be explained more soundly
in light of the rationale justifying attorney-client confidentiality. We
say that we extend confidentiality to such communications to insure
full disclosure to the attorney so that he may properly advise the
client. We assume that the client will be deterred from making full
disclosure unless such confidentiality is assured. On that basis there
is no reason to extend the protection of confidentiality to communi-
cations made to corporate officials who happen to be lawyers. They
must have the information that has been revealed to them so that
they can carry out their functions properly. This information must
be given to the negotiator who is an attorney as well as to the one
who is not. Therefore, no one is inhibited from giving information
on the grounds that it will not be secret. It is true that the corporation
may have hoped for confidentiality in putting lawyers in that position,
but assuming it wished to complete the transaction, it would have
had to put some persons in that position to whom the information
would have to be transmitted. Thus, there is no reason to extend
confidentiality to such a situation, as there is no inhibition because
of lack of confidentiality.
It is submitted that the same reasoning justifies a denial of
confidentiality to communications made to house counsel. It is
impossible to draw a distinction between his activities in a legal
capacity and those in a business one. But more significantly, no one
is deterred from telling him anything for fear it will not be confidential.
77 Such as president, chairman of the board and the like. Roger Blough of United
States Steel is a good example.
78 18 F.R.D. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
79 See also the discussion of the need to segregate communications in Simon,
supra note 70, at 971-972. Courts may be afraid that too much information will be
insulated otherwise.
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The corporate structure is such that he is the party to whom such com-
munications must be made. He is a member of the corporate team
just as the other corporate officials. He has to receive certain infor-
mation under the corporate organization where legal questions may
arise. The situation is no different than where the vice-president
receives information because such information is to be routed through
his office. If the corporation has established house counsel, information
relating to legal matters is to be routed through his office. The
rationale justifying confidentiality disappears here because of the
lack of inhibition. Just as communications made to the lawyer-vice-
president are not protected from disclosure, so should communications
made to the lawyer-house counsel not be protected. Each is a member
of the corporate team to whom the information must be disclosed
under corporate policy. The conference with the house counsel does
not have the same inference as the conference with the outside attorney
-one is a member of the team who happens to be a lawyer; the
other is an attorney to whom certain things will be revealed only when
there is the assurance of confidentiality.
This was recognized by the court in Cogdill v. T.V.A., s° where
the court observed the structure of T.V.A. and held that the legal
staff was no different than other employees. The court stated:
Even if the attorney-client relationship were inviolate under the
Rules, it does not appear that the information asked for here is
such as would be obtainable peculiarly by attorneys, particularly
in the light of the circumstances of this case. In a government
agency, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, large and exten-
sively departmentalized, with a co-ordinator, or general manager,
and a board of directors, it seems reasonable to suppose that no com-
plex matter of information would be exclusively obtained by or be-
come the exclusive property of a single department, but would be
the achievement and the property of the over-all unit; that the mem-
bers of the legal staff would not be free and independent attorneys
in the usual sense, but, like the information in their files, subject
to the beck and call of their employer, whom otherwise they call
their client.81
This observation is equally apt to a corporation large enough
to have house counsel. The import is that the information is given
to them in their capacity as members of the team and there is no
deterence in communicating.
The extension of confidentiality to communications to house
counsel seems like an effort on the part of the courts to reassure the
egos of house counsel that they are still "attorneys" even though they
80 7 F.R.D. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1947).
81 Id. at 414-415.
[Vol. 24
ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENCES
are now employed by a corporation. This is irrelevant. The point is
that granted, they are lawyers in the full sense, there is no need to
extend confidentiality to communications made to them because the
same communications would be made even in the absence of confi-
dentiality. Where the rationale for confidentiality has disappeared,
house counsel should be subject to the requirement of disclosure as
other corporate officials.
4. Communications to Attorney's Agents
It is well settled that communications to the attorney's agents,
such as his confidential secretary, are entitled to confidentiality as
these persons are required to keep secret what they obtain by virtue
of their employment." The client feels free to disclose matters to
these persons because they are acting for the attorney. The attorney's
sponsorship of these persons is likely to give the client the same
assurances of secrecy as if the communication were made directly
to the attorney.
The interesting employment of this principle is to render immune
from disclosure communications rendered to certain persons where
they would not be immune if rendered to those persons in an
individual capacity. In State v. Kociolek, 3 for example, the attorneys
for a criminal defendant engaged a psychiatrist to examine the
defendant and report his finding to them. Even though commu-
nications to a psychiatrist were subject to disclosure, it was held that
those in the instant case were not, on the basis of attorney-client con-
fidentiality. Attorney-client confidentiality extends to necessary inter-
mediaries since, when the attorney sends the client to them, he is
impliedly assuring the client that anything he tells them will be
treated the same as anything he tells the attorney. The client is
entitled to assume confidentiality and the courts have upheld this
assurance. The same principle has justified a finding of confidentiality
as to communications made to physicians examining the client at the
attorney's request 4 and an accountant engaged by an attorney to
assist in the defense.8
5
82 See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 177 S.E. 582 (1934). Cf. Wartell v.
Novograd, 48 R.I. 296, 137 Aft. 776 (1927), where the court held that a law student
working in the attorney's office was not an agent within the meaning of attorney-client
confidentiality.
83 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957).
84 Ex parte Ochse, 38 Cal. 2d 230, 238 P.2d 561 (1951); City and County of San
Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
85 Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
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5. What Constitutes a Communication
Not all information that an attorney receives from the client is
considered a communication for purposes of protection from disclosure.
There are certain things that an attorney will discover or will be told
by the client that are not entitled to confidentiality, either because it is
obvious they were not intended to be confidential or because they must
be revealed to establish the existence of the relationship. In ascer-
taining what constitutes a communication for purposes of confidential-
ity, those two criteria will be employed. A communication within the
meaning of attorney-client confidentiality is defined as a fact that
was disclosed by the client and not intended to be revealed to others.
The clear communication is the information imparted to the
attorney relating to the reasons why the client consulted the attorney,
such as the reasons why he wanted to make a will 6 or information
given in response to the attorney's explanation of the client's legal
rights.8 7 Communications include acts that are obviously intended
to be confidential such as a handwriting specimen. 8s At the other
extreme would be the receipt of documents the client would be required
to produce, which obviously is not a communication.8 9 The client
would not be inhibited from delivering these documents to the attorney
for fear they will be disclosed, as he is aware or will be made aware
by the attorney that the client himself must produce them in response
to a subpoena duces tecum. Because of the lack of inhibition, this
is not treated as a communication and the attorney can be required
to produce them or testify as to their contents. By the same token,
information received by the attorney from others is not entitled to
confidentiality on the basis of the relationship as this information was
not received from the client."0 Absent the situation where the other
U.S. 860 (1949). Here, however, the court found that the communication was made
to the attorney in the presence of the accountant who was not "indispensably necessary."
Therefore, it held that the communication to the attorney was not privileged. Implied
is a holding that if the communication were made to the attorney or the accountant it
would be entitled to confidentiality, but not if made in the presence of each other.
This is illogical. The court should have considered whether the client was entitled to
assume confidentiality when he made the statement, and if the accountant were engaged
by the attorney, the client should have been entitled to so assume.
s6 Youngberg v. Holstrom, 252 Iowa 815, 108 N.W.2d 498 (1961).
87 In re Van Gorder's Will, 10 Misc. 2d 648, 176 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
88 See the discussion in 8 Wigmore § 2306, at 590.
89 See, e.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 864 (1953); Pearson v. Yoder, 39 Okla. 105, 134 Pac. 421 (1913).
90 See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266
(1961) ; Dupree v. Better Way, Inc., 86 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1956) ; In re Dalton's Estate, 346
Mich. 613, 78 N.W.2d 266 (1956). However, sometimes courts blindly apply this prin-
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witness is an employee of the client, which will be discussed subse-
quently, there is no question of inhibition as the information is not
received from the client. Therefore, such information is not con-
sidered a communication within the meaning of attorney-client con-
fidentiality.
Equally clear is that the fact of representation cannot be con-
sidered a communication, since until negotiations are shown there can
be no claim of attorney-client confidentiality. 9 Moreover, the fact
of representation may be an issue in the case, such as where a party
seeking release on habeas corpus claims he was not represented by an
attorney. 2 It may be stated, then, that where the fact in issue is
whether a communication was made, the matter is not treated as
a communication within the meaning of attorney-client confidentiality.
Not all situations are so readily categorized, and difficulty is
encountered in determining exactly what constitutes a communication
within the meaning of attorney-client confidences. The courts are
agreed that the existence of a retainer is not a communication,93 but
are split as to the terms of a retainer.94 The client does not expect
the existence of a retainer to be confidential; however, as to the terms,
it would seem that the client would expect them to be secret unless
a dispute should arise between him and the attorney. If a client knew
that the terms of the retainer were subject to general disclosure,
he might well be inhibited from even consulting the attorney in the
first place. A good example might be where a client having marital
difficulties consults an attorney and does not want the other spouse
to know he or she has such funds to retain an attorney. Inasmuch as
the client would be likely to assume the amount of the retainer would
be confidential, it should be considered a communication for this
purpose.
The authority of an attorney to act for the client may be shown
ciple without considering whether the person making the communication to the attorney
could be considered the client's agent, in which event the client would be entitled to
assume confidentiality. In Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956), for example, the court held that information received
from the client's accountant was not entitled to confidentiality.
91 See, e.g., Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914 (D. Mass. 1958).
92 Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948).
93 See, e.g., Myer v. Myer, 189 Misc. 406, 71 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd,
272 App. Div. 814, 72 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1947).
94 Compare Registered Country Home Builders, Inc. v. Lanchantin, 10 App.
Div. 2d 721, 198 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1960) (no communication) with VIMagida on Behalf of
Vulcan Detining Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (com-
munication and entitled to confidentiality).
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on the theory that it involves the fact in issueY5 The point is that
the client does not expect that fact to be confidential if the attorney is
effectively to act for him.
Ordinarily the identity of the client is not considered a commu-
nication, as the client does not intend it to be confidential. 6 The
client will expect the attorney to state who he was if this is necessary
to properly represent him. On the other hand, where the circumstances
are such that the client would not wish the fact that he consulted an
attorney to be disclosed, the identity of the client is entitled to con-
fidentiality. Such a situation was involved in Baird v. Koerner.7 An
attorney had paid a sum of taxes to the Director of Internal Revenue
on behalf of undisclosed clients for delinquent taxes. He was contacted
through another attorney and did not know the names of the clients.
He was requested by the Department of Internal Revenue to disclose
the name of the other attorney, who was actually his client and from
whom the Department hoped to obtain the names of the parties making
payment. It was held that he could not be compelled to disclose. Here
all parties wished the names of the parties making payment to be
secret; the court observed that the Government was trying by indi-
rection to obtain the identity of persons who made anonymous pay-
ment. Since it was intended by the client to be confidential, the identi-
fication was considered a communication, which here means a fact not
intended to be revealed.
The same principle was applicable in Ex parte McDonough,"8
where the identification of the client would have tended to show an
acknowledgment of guilt on his part. The attorney had been employed
to represent clients in connection with certain election frauds. The
attorney was then asked by the grand jury to reveal who employed
him to represent the three who were later indicted. The court held
that the person who employed the attorney would wish to have that
matter be kept in confidence as revelation would tend to link him with
those indicted. Therefore, attorney-client confidentiality attached.
Note the analogy to the privilege against self-incrimination. The
client would have refused to answer whether he employed an attorney
to represent those indicted; the same rationale justifies the attorney's
refusal to answer a question that would have the same effect.99
95 Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Fink, 141 Cal. App. 2d 322, 296 P.2d
843 (1956) (authority to sign stipulation); McKeague v. Freitas, 40 Haw. 108 (1953)
(authority to enter into contract).
96 See, e.g., Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 616, 335 P.2d 484 (1959) ; In re
Richardson, 31 N.J. 391, 157 A.2d 695 (1960).
97 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
98 170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac. 556 (1915).
99 A contrary result was reached in People ex reL Vogelstein v. Warden of County
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The intention for anonymity is the basis of explanation for the
result in In re Kaplan.0 0 There the client retained the attorney to
pass certain information to a public investigating body. The attorney
was questioned as to this information, which he revealed, but refused
to identify his client on the ground that the client feared reprisals
from the persons whom he incriminated. It was held the attorney
could refuse to reveal the name on the basis of attorney-client confi-
dentiality. The court observed that it was the client's name that
needed protection. More realistically, the client would not have
come to the attorney-nor given the information to the commission-
except for the implied assurance of anonymity. Since the client
intended his identity to be confidential, it is a communication within
the meaning of attorney-client confidentiality. It is, therefore, inac-
curate to state as a general proposition that the identity of the client
is not within attorney-client confidentiality. More realistically, the
identity is not a protected communication when it was not intended
to be confidential, but is within the privilege when the circumstances
are such that the client's intent to remain anonymous may be inferred.
What of impressions as to the client's competency and the like
that the attorney obtains during the course of his employment?
Assuming that there is someone who may raise confidentiality even
if the client is dead,101 some courts have held that the attorney could
not testify as to the client's competency on the basis of observations
made during the course of his employment." 2 These courts observe
that communications may include acts as well as words and that
the client intended whatever went on in the lawyer's office to be confi-
dential. Persons, particularly older ones, may be concerned with
their peculiarities, which to them are natural. They might not reveal
certain things that are necessary-if the lawyer is to properly advise
them-if they thought that he could testify as to those things. If
the attorney would conclude that the testator was not of sound mind,
he would not be drawing a will, so the question will arise only when
an attorney who did not draw the will is testifying the client was
jail, 150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y.S. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1934), where the attorney refused to
answer a question as to the name of his client in a grand jury investigation. The issue
was which of certain defendants allegedly represented by the attorney did not plead
guilty to a lottery charge. The grand jury was investigating lotteries and presumably
looking for violators to indict. Clearly the client would wish the fact that he was
indicted and represented by the attorney at the former trial kept secret.
100 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660 (1960).
101 See notes 208-216 infra, and accompanying text.
102 In re Coon's Estate, 154 Neb. 690, 48 N.V.2d 778 (1951); Taylor v. Sheldon,
172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961); Pollard v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 343 S.W.2d
909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
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of unsound mind. Since the client intended his actions to be confi-
dential and would assume that the attorney would not reveal anything
he discovered during those meetings, the client's acts constitute a com-
munication to the attorney. On the other hand, an attorney has been
permitted to testify that a client was intoxicated. 10 3 This involved a
condition over which the client had no control. There was no question
of the client's intent that the fact be kept secret so the rationale justi-
fying confidentiality was inapplicable. The client's competency, then,
and the acts on which an opinion as to such competency are based
constitute a communication when the circumstances are such that
the client would assume that what he said and did in the presence
of the attorney would not be revealed.
Neither the fact of execution of an instrument 10 4 nor its attes-
tation 1 can be regarded as a communication within the meaning of
attorney-client confidentiality. The word is used to denote, as one
court has observed, "the fact that one person has brought an idea
to the perception of another."' Here the client generally does not
intend the fact of execution to be secret; rather he expects the attorney
to verify that it was done. Revelation of attestation is necessary
for the instrument to be valid. In some circumstances, however, the
client may have desired that the execution be kept secret, at least
for a period of time. Examples might be where he wanted the fact
that he made a will kept secret during his lifetime, or where he exe-
cuted a deed which he did not want to record. Since in those circum-
stances, he was relying on attorney-client confidentiality and may not
have done the act unless he could rely on such confidentiality, the
requirement of disclosure would be improper.
By the same token, money received from others for the benefit
of the client is not a communication. 0 7 Here the client revealed
nothing to the attorney so there is no question of inhibition of dis-
closure. The client does not assume that the fact that the attorney
received the money would be any more secret than if the client himself
received it. Note that this is limited to the fact of receipt by the
attorney. Statements by the client that he received the money from
the third party, why the money was owing and the like, would clearly
be communications within the meaning of attorney-client confiden-
103 State v. Fitzgerald, 68 Vt. 125, 34 Atl. 429 (1896).
104 See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 140 Cal. App. 2d 475, 295 P.2d 131 (1956);
In re Coon's Estate, supra note 102.
115 See, e.g., In re Wilkin's Estate, 199 Okla. 249, 185 P.2d 213 (1947).
106 In re Coon's Estate, supra note 102, at 782.
107 See, e.g., Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953); Vicari v.
Talaro, 94 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 1957).
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tiality. As the foregoing indicates, the test for determining what
constitutes a communication should be related to the client's state of
mind rather than to the nature of the communication itself. If the
circumstances are such that confidentiality was intended, a thing may
constitute a communication, though in the absence of such circum-
stances it would not, merely because there was no intention that it
be kept confidential.
6. Communications by Client's Agents
Previously we have discussed the question of who speaks for
the corporation within the meaning of attorney-client confidentiality
and have concluded that managing and communicating agents are
deemed to be the client for purposes of such confidentiality."' 8
The question then arises as to the extent that statements by employees
of the client, either individual or corporate, should be entitled to the
same confidentiality. It must be remembered that these parties are
not ordinary witnesses. They are identified with the client and may be
"part of the team." In order for the client to properly obtain advice
from his attorney, it may be necessary that some agents, at least,
have the same freedom from inhibition as the client. It is submitted,
therefore, that where the agent would be inhibited from fully disclosing
matters because of the fear of revelation in the same manner as the
client, confidentiality attaches to the agent's statements as well as
to those of the client. For example, if the client first interviewed the
agent, ascertained the facts he could from him, and then revealed
these facts to the attorney-what would be revealed would be con-
fidential. Should the result be any different if the process is "short-
circuited" and the conduit eliminated? When, in order for the client's
case to be effectively presented to the attorney, communications from
the client's employees are involved, they should be entitled to confi-
dentiality under the same criteria as those made by the client himself;
that is, if the agent would have been inhibited from revealing what
he did because of the possibility of disclosure by the attorney, the
communication should be entitled to confidentiality. The problem,
then, is to determine when the information sought to be elicited from
the attorney was obtained by the agent under such circumstances that
inhibition would result from the possibility of disclosure.
As to managing and communication agents of an individual
employer, the result should be the same as with a corporate employer.
These persons are identified as the employer and consider themselves
as acting in that capacity. Consequently they would be deterred
108 See notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text.
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under the same circumstances as would he. The problem arises as
to communications made by source agents, e.g., the bus driver or
salesman, or other agents not so intimately identified with management.
The clearest case where confidentiality should attach is where
an independent agent is employed with a view toward litigation. In
Brink v. Multinomak County,10 9 an appraiser had been employed by
a condemnor to observe the property in question and make a report
to the attorney representing the condemnor. It was held that the
attorney could not be required to reveal what was disclosed to him
by the appraiser. The court emphasized that the appraiser was not
employed until litigation was imminent and that the report was made
for use in connection with litigation. What transpired between the
appraiser and the attorney was no different than what would have
transpired between the client and the attorney. The report was
intended for the attorney's use only in the defense of the case."" Had
it been the subject of revelation, it may well have been that the
client would not have wanted the appraiser to present it to the attorney,
which might have interfered with the effective presentation of the
client's case."' Here, the appraiser was performing special services
for the client in preparation of the case and in that context, the
rationale justifying confidentiality for the client's communications is
equally applicable.
The same is true where the employee is "litigation conscious";
that is, his duties require him to be concerned with litigation. In such
a situation, his statements, reports and the like should be confidential
since he acts for the client in regard to litigation. Thus, documents
and reports prepared by claim agents,"' employees of a special depart-
ment that reported to the claim agent," 3 and railroad conductors who
were to submit reports for use of counsel" 4 have been held entitled
to confidentiality. The principle has been held applicable to a report
made by any agent with the understanding that it was to be submitted
to counsel." 5 These parties are making the communications with a
view toward litigation and the nature of their duties indicates that
109 224 Ore. 507, 356 P.2d 536 (1960).
110 Note the analogy to the work-product rule for discovery purposes. Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
111 Here the attorney was house counsel.
112 In re Hyde, 149 Ohio-St. 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948).
113 State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257
S.W.2d 69 (1953).
114 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Williams, 21 Ga. App. 453, 94 S.E. 584 (1917).
115 Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954); Davenport Co.
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 166 Pa. 480, 31 At. 245 (1895).
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they are making the reports with regard to legal use. They assume
these communications are entitled to confidentiality, as would be the
case if they were consulting the lawyer on their own behalf. Conse-
quently, inhibition might result if these communications were not con-
fidential, with the resulting impairment of the employer's obtaining
full legal assistance.
The main problem revolves around statements made by low-
ranking employees. The question arises as to the extent to which
they are litigation conscious as to the particular communications
sought to be disclosed; that is, would they be inhibited in what they
said because of the possibility of disclosure by an attorney? It should
be noted that this problem is most likely to arise in discovery pro-
ceedings as their statements and reports would not be likely to qualify
as admissions within the hearsay rule because of their low-ranking
status." 6 In an actual interview with the attorney, confidentiality
should attach. The inhibiting factor is equally present; at that
juncture, they are in the same position as the employer. Since this
is so, and since if he interviewed them first and then reported to the
attorney, it would be privileged, the result should be no different if
they speak to the attorney directly.
As to reports made by such employees which eventually find their
way into the hands of the attorney, the question must be again posed:
Would the report or statement have been likely to contain or fail to
contain certain information, necessary to the effective securing of
legal advice by the employer, depending on whether it is subject
to disclosure in the hands of the attorney? A clear situation where
the inhibiting factor was present was Schmidt v. Emery,"' where the
claim agent obtained a statement about the accident from the bus
driver after the accident on the advice of the company's attorney.
Here the driver knew that what he said was to be transmitted to the
attorney and was entitled to assume confidentiality.
But many reports are routine, and the courts have concluded, in
some situations at least, that they are not confidential because they
are not prepared with a view toward litigation. In other words,
if the employee was making a report because regulations required
him to do so after every accident and not with a view toward trans-
mittal to the attorney, he would not be inhibited because of fear of
disclosure by the attorney as he was not thinking about such disclosure.
He may have been inhibited by other factors such as his own liability
116 For a discussion of the status of low-ranking agents for admission purposes, see
State ex rel. Kresge Co. v. Shain, 340 Mo. 145, 101 S.,V.2d 14 (1936).
117 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.AV.2d 413 (1942).
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or disciplinary matters, but no additional inhibition exists because
of possible revelation by the attorney. Thus, in Brown v. Saint Paul
City Ry. Co.,"' the court which found confidentiality in Schmidt v.
Emery found that an accident report made by a trolley conductor
was not privileged because it was not shown to be anything other than
a routine report which would have had to have been made if no injury
occurred and any possibility of litigation was remote. Confidentiality
was likewise denied in Robertson v. Commonwealth' 9 where the report
was made on the day of the accident by the motorman on a printed
form furnished for such purpose.
A series of California cases emphasizes the difficulty in drawing
the distinction between reports submitted with a view toward litigation
and those made routinely. In Holm v. Superior Court,2' the court
found that reports submitted by a bus driver and photographs made
were intended for the use of the attorney and confidentiality attached.
The use of photographs in connection with the report would be
evidence of consciousness of litigation. In City and County of San
Francisco v. Superior Court,121 however, it was held that the list of
names and addresses of passengers on a bus which the bus driver
delivered to the dispatcher was not entitled to confidentiality. It
was found that these were submitted routinely without thought of
litigation. In Jessup v. Superior Court," where a child died by
drowning in a public swimming pool and the department of public
safety subsequently conducted an investigation, it was held that the
report delivered to the attorney was entitled to confidentiality. Here,
litigation could clearly be expected to result from the incident.123 In
Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines,"4 the court concluded that an
accident report made by a bus driver pursuant to company rules
was confidential. The report was prepared in triplicate, one copy
of which went to the attorney for the insurance carrier. However,
in Safeway Stores Inc. v. Superior Court,'2 an accident report sub-
mitted by the manager of a chain store to the accounting office was
held not entitled to confidentiality, though it ultimately went to the
insurer. The theory was that, insofar as the manager was concerned,
he was making a report to the accounting office.
118 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954).
119 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943).
120 Supra note 115.
121 161 Cal. App. 2d 653, 327 P.2d 195 (1958).
122 151 Cal. App. 2d 102, 311 P.2d 177 (1957).
123 Investigations such as this were always kept confidential by the department.
124 170 Cal. App. 2d 709, 339 P.2d 567 (1957).
125 14 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Cal. App. 1961).
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These cases indicate the difficulty in drawing the line. 2 ' It has
been suggested that the matter be resolved on the basis of burden of
proof; that is, the party seeking confidentiality must prove that the
report would not have been prepared except for use by counsel.1
2 7
Some of the cases have concluded against confidentiality on the ground
that the employer failed to sustain his burden of showing that the
dominant purpose of the reports was submission to counsel. 2 It is
submitted that such reports should not be considered confidential
unless, as in Schmidt v. Emery, the report was not a routine one and
the employee clearly understood it was to be submitted to counsel. To
ask whether the employee is thinking in terms of litigation is futile
here. To some extent he well may be, but the point is not thrust at
him to the same extent as if he were being interviewed by the
attorney or was told to make a special report for use by the attorney.
More significantly it would seem that the employee's prime concern
would be with preparing the report in such a way as to avoid any
disciplinary action against himself. His connection with the attorney
in such a situation seems too remote to say that he was appreciably
inhibited in what he said because of fear that this would be disclosed
by an attorney to whom such a report might be submitted. The
rationale of attorney-client confidentiality would prevent its application
to such a situation.
II. Loss OF CONFIDENTIALITY
In this portion of the article we are concerned with when confi-
dentiality is lost because the circumstances, either at the time of
making or subsequently, indicate that confidentiality was not intended
or because of waiver of confidentiality. We will employ the basic
criteria in the former section: Are the circumstances such that the
client intended the communication to be confidential and would reveal
things he otherwise would not disclose in reliance on such confiden-
tiality?
1. Secrecy
Where the client does not consider the communication to be con-
fidential, then, of course, it is entitled to no such protection-he
reveals nothing that he would not have revealed except for assurances
126 See the discussion in McCormick § 100.
127 Simon, supra note 71, at 978.
128 This apparently was the rationale behind the decisions in Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Superior Court, supra note 125; Brown v. Saint Paul City Ry. Co., supra note 118;
and Robertson v. Commonwealth, supra note 119.
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of confidentiality. If the matter is not revealed to the attorney in
secrecy, logically the client has not told him anything he would not
have told others because of his status as an attorney. The problem,
however, is that courts have been most unrealistic in finding an absence
of secrecy because of the presence of another person without consid-
ering who that person is. Even though a third party is present, and
depending on who he is, the client may feel that what he says will be
kept secret; that is, the other person present will not reveal it. There-
fore, he does not indicate disdain for whether or not the attorney can
disclose it. Since he assumes the other person will not reveal what is
said, he feels as free in his disclosures to the attorney as if the other
party were not present. For example, if a husband and wife went
to see the attorney together about the husband's legal problem, con-
fidentiality would exist because (assuming requisite confidence as to
wife) what was revealed to the wife would qualify as a marital com-
munication, which is privileged. Since she could not reveal what was
said, the communication to the attorney would be equally confiden-
tial.129 Similarly, if a mother went with a four-year-old son and took
him into the attorney's office, it is not supposed that it would be
said that what the mother revealed to the attorney would not be
entitled to confidentiality. But what if the child were eighteen; or
the child were an adult and the parents were aged? Or the child
went to see the attorney and was accompanied by the parent? What
if the party is accompanied by a close relative or friend? Is this an
indication that he did not intend what he revealed to the attorney
to be confidential? As will be demonstrated, the courts in this regard
have at times ignored normal patterns of human behavior in deter-
mining when confidentiality is destroyed because of the presence of
others.
Too often the courts tend to think of the one-to-one situation-
the client and attorney are conferring in subdued tones after making
certain that no one can overhear; in such a situation there can be no
doubt that confidentiality was intended. Equally obvious is the situa-
tion where confidentiality was not intended. One example would be the
disclosure to the attorney of the selling price of property which was
known to the other party to the transaction and which could be de-
duced from the amount of revenue stamps that appeared on the
129 Smith v. State, 203 Ga. 569, 47 S.E.2d 579 (1948). There the wife and her
husband had conferred with the attorney about the wife's filing of a divorce action.
The state sought to introduce the conversation as evidence of the wife's motive for
killing the husband. See also State v. Bell, 212 Mo. 111, 111 S.V. 24 (1908), where it
was held that the wife could not be examined as to matters she told the husband's
counsel in preparation for the husband's defense. Here the husband was not present.
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recorded deed. ° Another would be where others are present whose
interest might be adverse to the client and who are comparative
strangers, such as statements by the grantor to his attorney in the
presence of the grantee.1 31 By the same token, where the statement
was to be delivered by the attorney to third parties, the client obviously
did not intend it to be confidential, so there could be no objection to
the attorney's disclosing it.
132
The disputed area is where third parties are present whose
interest is not adverse to the client. It is admitted today that the
presence of the attorney's assistants does not destroy confidentiality
as such persons may be necessary to help conduct the interview. If,
as discussed previously, 33 communications made to those persons as
the attorney's agents would be entitled to confidentiality, obviously
their presence while the client was conversing with the attorney would
not destroy it. Professor McCormick observes that "confidentiality
would not depend on whether the presence of the person in the par-
ticular instance was necessary, as that is the way business is done.1
3 1
The client does not necessarily know whether that person's presence
is necessary and is not thinking in those terms. The point is that he
is relying on the attorney's sponsorship of these persons and assumes
that what he is saying is said in confidence despite their presence.
With this orientation, the result in Himelfarb v. United States35
is inexplicable. The attorney engaged an accountant to attend the
conference with the client on tax matters. The court held that his
presence destroyed confidentiality and that the attorney could be
required to disclose what was revealed to him. The basis of the
decision was that the accountant's presence was not necessary, but
was a "imere convenience for the taxpayer." Earlier we have seen
that other courts have held communications to an accountant engaged
by the attorney as confidential on the ground that they were made to
the attorney's agent. A fortiori, the presence of the agent should not
render nonconfidential the statement made to the attorney! The
court here failed to consider the underlying rationale of attorney-
client confidentiality, that the client assumes the statement is confi-
130 Ramacorti v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 341 Mass. 728, 170 N.E.2d
323 (1960).
131 Short v. Kleppinger, 163 Neb. 729, 81 N.W.2d 182 (1957).
132 See, e.g., Xvilcoxson v. United States, 231 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 943 (1956); Spencer v. Burns, 413 Il. 240, 108 N.E.2d 413 (1952); In re
Stein, 1 N.J. 228, 62 A.2d 801 (1947).
133 See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
134 McCormick § 95.
135 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
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dential because made to the attorney or his agent. The client assumes
such confidentiality where the presence of the other party is at the
attorney's direction without consideration of whether the presence is
cnecessary" or merely a "matter of convenience."
The prime example of unrealistic attitudes on the part of some
courts is where third persons were present who would not be expected
to be adverse to the client. Indeed, often the client brings them with
him. The test should be whether these persons were such that, in view
of their relationship to the client or other circumstances, the client
would feel no more inhibited in disclosure because of their presence
than he would in their absence. This principle was applied by the
court in People v. A bair'36 where four persons were charged with
narcotics violations arising out of the same transaction. An attorney
discussed the case with all four pending negotiations for representa-
tion, indicating that he could represent all four. It was held that
what one revealed to him was entitled to confidentiality. The court
apparently realized, as indicated by its reference to the fact that the
attorney stated he could represent all four, that the client was not
inhibited by the presence of the other defendants. They were all
indicted for similar offenses arising out of the same transaction-"all
in the same boat," so to speak. Under such circumstances, the client
considered what he said to be confidential; therefore, it should be
protected from disclosure.
What has caused the confusion in this area is the view that the
presence of a third person, such as a relative or friend, must "be
reasonably necessary for the protection of the client's interests in the
particular circumstances. 1 3 7 This is easy enough to apply where the
third party was the client's agent who took care of the aged and
infirm client and managed her business affairs, 13 or a private detec-
tive hired by the client to keep her husband under surveillance,1 39 or
the mother of .a young girl who had been seduced, allegedly for the
first time.1 40 The problem arises in a case such as Marshall v. Mar-
shall141 where the statements were made in the presence of the client's
136 102 Cal. App. 2d 765, 228 P.2d 336 (1951).
137 McCormick § 95.
138 This was involved in In re Busse's Estate, 332 Ill. App. 258, 75 N.E.2d 36
(1947). The court emphasized that the older concept that only an interpreter could
be present was outmoded in light of the way people conduct their affairs.
139 Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St. 593, 31 N.E.2d 845 (1951).
140 Bowes v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542 (1876). The mother was characterized "out
of decency and propriety" as the daughter's "confidential agent" due to her "youth
and supposed modesty."
141 140 Cal. App. 2d 475, 295 P.2d 131 (1956).
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son. Referring to the son as "a stranger," the court held that the
client did not intend that the statements be kept in confidence by
the attorney. There was nothing to indicate that the relationship
between father and son was not normal.
And in Gordon v. Robinson,1 2 the court denied confidentiality to
a statement made in the presence of the client's stepson on the ground
that his assistance was not necessary to familiarize the attorney with
the circumstances of the case.
It is submitted that the necessity of the presence of the third
person bears no relationship to attorney-client confidentiality. Such
confidentiality is recognized on the theory that the client must be
inhibited in his conversations with the attorney. He does not become
inhibited because of the presence of a third person who he assumes
will not reveal what has been disclosed. The test should be whether
the relationship between the third person and the client was such
that the client was no more inhibited in his revelations to the attorney
than he would have been if the third person had not been present.
People simply do not always go to see an attorney alone or speak
to him alone. They may be accompanied by relatives or close friends.
Perhaps the presence of these persons is not indispensably necessary,
but maybe the client needs their "moral support." Perhaps they also
have information to reveal and it is more efficient for the third
person and the client to see the attorney together. Irrespective of
the reason for their presence, if the client assumes they will keep
in confidence what is revealed there, then there is no reason to be-
lieve that he does not assume the attorney will do likewise. Since
he assumes confidentiality, what he reveals to the attorney should
not be subject to disclosure.
As stated at the outset, we often proceed on the assumption
that the attorney and the client are conferring free from intrusions of
outsiders. But sometimes they are unsuccessful in preventing such
intrusion and the question arises as to the effect on confidentiality
of a third person's interception of the communication. Obviously this
cannot affect confidentiality as between attorney and client. In In re
Lanza,14 3 the communication was electronically intercepted ("bugged")
by the police, who sought to compel the attorney to testify to what
was communicated on the ground that it was not "confidential."
The demand was denied. The point is that the client assumed confi-
dentiality; namely, that the attorney would not reveal what was
142 109 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Pa. 1952). The case was reversed on other grounds
and the question left open, 210 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1954).
143 4 App. Div. 2d 252, 164 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1957).
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disclosed. Therefore, the fact that others have heard is irrelevant as
regards the bar to the attorney's testimony.
But a different issue is presented when it is the eavesdropper
that seeks to testify. There is nothing in the rationale justifying
attorney-client confidentiality to prohibit such testimony. Dean Wig-
more has pointed out that the client's peace of mind is protected
despite the allowance of such testimony.'4 He is not deterred from
telling the attorney anything because of fear of revelation by third
parties because he assumes that third parties do not overhear what
is said. It is only when the attorney himself improperly reveals the
statement to a third party that the third party cannot testify, since
in that case the client did assume confidentiality when he disclosed
the matter to the attorney.145 Because of the lack of danger of
inhibition, some courts have permitted the eavesdropper to testify,
which is fully consistent with the rationale for the attorney-client
privilege we have given.'46
If such testimony is to be excluded, then it must be on the basis
of other grounds than the rationale justifying attorney-client confi-
dentiality. The Uniform Rules of Evidence, unlike, the Model Code,
hold such testimony inadmissible. 1 ' The rationale, as explained by
Professor Morgan, is "to give protection against, among other things,
modern gadgets, which make the conduct of confidential business in
ordinary circumstances practically impossible." 4 This represents a
societal policy protecting privacy, particularly from improper police
tactics, which is how such eavesdropping often occurs rather than
"hearing through the transom." This societal policy is reflected in
holding illegally obtained evidence inadmissible in both federal'4 9
and state' 50 prosecutions. In order for the attorney-client relation-
ship to function effectively, they must be permitted to conduct their
business in secrecy. Therefore, an eavesdropper should not be per-
144 8 Wigmore § 2326.
145 See Model Code of Evidence rule 210(3) (1942).
146 See, e.g., Erlich v. Erlich, 278 App. Div. 244, 104 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1951); Clark
v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (1953). The latter case is best explainable
on this ground rather than on the ground that it involved information as to a crime.
See the discussion in Quick, "Privileges Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence," 26 U.
Cinc. L. Rev. 537, 541 (1957).
147 Uniform Rule of Evidence 26.
14s Morgan, "The Uniform Rules and the Model Code," 31 Tul. L. Rev. 145, 146
(1956).
149 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also United States v. Coplon,
185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), involving interception of conversations between an
attorney and client.
150 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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mitted to testify, even though such testimony would not run counter
to attorney-client confidentiality as we are employing the concept.
2. Advice as to Crime or Wrongdoing
It is a general rule that confidentiality is not applicable where the
client consults the attorney for advice as to the commission of a
crime 1 ' in the future or any wrongful scheme, such as procuring
admission of a forged document to probate0 2 or defrauding the
Government by misrepresenting the cost of tuition which the Veterans
Administration was to pay.1 3 It should be noted, however, that loss
of confidentiality is to be limited to the situation where it is the
client who seeks advice as to improper conduct he will commit in
the future. In Ex parte Enzor,'1 4 the client had been an election
official in the primary and was to serve in the same capacity during
the run-off. He told the attorney either that a third party had offered
him a bribe or that he had accepted a bribe and asked the attorney
what to do. The attorney replied that he should count the ballots
correctly. The court held that confidentiality was not lost. If the
client had accepted the bribe, then this would be advice as to past
action, to which confidentiality clearly attaches. Since he did not ask
the attorney whether he could accept a bribe and avoid detection, it
was held that he was not seeking advice as to the commission of
future wrongdoing and confidentiality was applicable. On the other
hand, if the client is, in fact, seeking advice as to future wrong-
doing, confidentiality does not attach, even if the attorney is unaware
of the improper purpose. 5
By the same token, where the client does not seek advice as to
the future commission of wrongdoing or concealing a crime already
committed, the fact that the attorney voluntarily offers advice as to
such improper conduct should not destroy confidentiality. In Clark v.
State,'0 6 the client had murdered his wife and called his attorney. The
151 See McCormick § 99 and cases cited therein; 8 Wigmore § 2298 and cases cited
therein. A case applying the traditional rationale is Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1
(1932). Note that where the testimony comes from a third party, the client cannot
claim the privilege against self-incrimination-this comes in as an admission. Abbott v.
Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 19, 177 P.2d 317 (1947).
152 In re Koellen's Estate, 167 Kan. 676, 208 P.2d 595 (1949). The court referred
to the communication as pertaining to "actual fraud involving moral turpitude."
153 United States v. Weinberg, 226 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
933 (1956).
154 270 Ala. 254, 117 So. 2d 361 (1960).
155 In re Selser, 15 NJ. 593, 105 A.2d 395 (1954). The court found that the
attorney was unaware of the illegal purpose and said this was immaterial.
16 Supra note 146.
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attorney advised him to conceal the murder weapon. When an eaves-
dropper sought to testify, it was held that the communication was not
privileged since it involved advice as to how the client could safely
escape arrest and punishment for a crime he had committed.157 The
reasoning is fallacious. It was the attorney who gave improper advice,
not the client who sought it. As Professor Quick has pointed out,
"If the privilege is in fact the client's rather than the lawyer's, it
should be impossible for the lawyer to destroy it by the kind of advice
given."' 5 Here, the communication related to the concealing of
evidence and the fact was that the client did conceal it. Nonetheless,
if the client is to have confidence in what he tells the lawyer, he
should not have to be concerned lest the lawyer's improper advice
destroy confidentiality.
The general rule, denying confidentiality to requests for advice
as to the commission of future wrongdoing, when properly applied,
is sound and in accord with the underlying rationale of attorney-client
confidentiality. However, explanations of the exception in terms of
"perversion of the privilege"'159 or "such advice not falling within the
just scope of the attorney-client relationship"'"0 or "contrary to
social policy"' 6 are unnecessary. Rather the denial of confidentiality
can be justified within the boundaries of the rationale we have
suggested. If the client is to obtain legal assistance to effectuate his
wrongdoing, he must disclose his wrongful intention. If the attorney
is part of the conspiracy, then the attorney is a member of the team
just as the other conspirators and the "client" is no more inhibited in
disclosing the matter to the attorney than to the other members of the
conspiracy. 62 It should be noted that the attorney could not be
required to testify due to the privilege against self-incrimination, but
may voluntarily do so,163 or if he has revealed it to a third party,
the third party may testifyT
The rationale is applicable even if the attorney is not a part of
the conspiracy. Perhaps in such a situation, the client may believe
what he tells the attorney is confidential, but more likely he does
not and takes the risk. Persons realize they are taking a risk when
they disclose wrongful intentions to anyone, and this is not changed
157 Ibid.
158 Quick, supra note 146, at 541.
159 McCormick § 99.
160 8 Wigmore § 2298, at 572.
161 Model Code of Evidence, comments to rule 212 (1942).
162 This was the factual situation in United States v. Weinberg, supra note 153.
163 See ibid.
164 This was the factual situation in Abbot v. Superior Court, supra note 151.
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because the party is an attorney. As a practical matter, they probably
believe the attorney will go along with the scheme and are not
considering the question of confidentiality on the basis of attorney-
client relationships.
In any event, in so far as the attorney-client relationship itself
is concerned, there is a consideration competing with secrecy. Under
Canon 37 it is expressly provided that the announced intention to
commit a crime is not a confidence that the attorney is bound to
respect. He may properly make such disclosures as are necessary to
protect those threatened. A slight extension would include all types
of wrongdoing to which the exception is thought to apply, which
often constitute crimes as well. This indicates that even at the risk
to confidentiality, the attorney may act to prevent crime and wrong-
doing. If he may act despite the injury to attorney-client confiden-
tiality, then the policy justifying the sacrifice there would also justify
permitting him to disclose the matter at a trial.
However, the reference to the canons indicates what we consider
a defect in the present administration of confidentiality as to requests
for advice in furtherance of wrongdoing. The Canon gives the lawyer
the privilege to disclose rather than imposing the duty upon him to
do so.""5 This distinction is significant. What if the attorney feels
in a particular case where he has advised the client not to commit
the wrong that his duty not to disclose outweighs his privilege to
disclose? He is an officer of the court and is charged with the respon-
sibility of upholding the dignity of his profession and judicial adminis-
tration. Should he be required to disclose confidences even though
made with a desire for advice as to wrongdoing? In the majority of
the cases, it is the attorney who is testifying and the client who is
trying to prevent the testimony. In In re Selser,0 6 however, this
was not the case. The attorney refused to testify on the ground that
the communication was confidential. His conviction for contempt was
upheld on the ground that the communication was not confidential
since the client sought advice as to the commission of a crime. The
court expressly stated that it was the judge's responsibility and not
the lawyer's to decide whether the seal of privacy is to be broken.
It is submitted that the court should respect the lawyer's judg-
ment, since only he understands all the facts surrounding the com-
munication. He has a part to play in the administration of justice
and only he can gauge whether the injury to attorney-client relations
is outweighed by the injury to the administration of justice resulting
165 We are using the term in the Hohfeldian sense.
166 Supra note 155.
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from nondisclosure. It is submitted that this aspect of Canon 37
become a part of the substantive law and that while the attorney may
reveal confidences if the client seeks advice as to the commission of
wrongdoing, he should not be compelled to do so. In the long run
justice cannot be well-served by compelling attorneys to disclose
confidences of "bad clients" where the attorney in good faith believes
they should be confidential.
3. Mutual Attorney
Where two or more parties consult an attorney, this does not
mean that the communication was not intended to be confidential.
The parties were not inhibited by the presence of each other, but
would be inhibited if they thought what they revealed to the lawyer
would be divulged just as if each had approached the attorney singly.
It is, therefore, well settled that, as against third parties, such com-
munications are entitled to confidentiality. 167
But the problem arises when these parties subsequently have
a falling out and litigation results in which one seeks the testimony of
the attorney. He clearly can testify, as the testimony does not involve
a confidential matter as between the parties.08 At the time of the
communication they would not be inhibited by each other's presence
or knowledge any more than they would be in regard to any other
dealing. It could also be contended that the parties impliedly agree that
the attorney is to testify as to what actually transpired if they do
have a dispute among themselves in the future. 169
It becomes necessary then to determine when, in fact, the
attorney was acting for both parties so that the communications are
not entitled to confidentiality inter se. A common situation is where
he represented both parties to a joint venture such as the purchase 7 °
or management of property,' 7 ' or the operation of a business. 72
Often he may be performing the same services for both parties such
as the drafting of mutual wills, 173 a family settlement, 17 4 the transfer
167 See, e.g., Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y. 420, 28 N.E. 651 (1891). See generally
the discussion in McCormick § 95.
168 Ibid.
169 See Henke v. Iowa Mutual Casualty Co., 249 Iowa 614, 87 N.W.2d 920 (1958).
This involved an insured and an insurer, where the insurer supplied the attorney.
170 In re Buckhardt's Estate, 129 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
171 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 151 Neb. 113, 36 N.W.2d 637 (1949).
172 Graham v. Williams, 166 A.2d 412 (R.I. 1961); Evans v. Evans, 8 Utah 2d
26, 327 P.2d 260 (1958).
173 Eicholtz v. Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666, 21 N.W.2d 914 (1946).
174 Walker v. Mason, 75 Ga. App. 229, 43 S.E.2d 116 (1947).
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of property from one to the other,175 or representing them in
litigation.1
76
There are some situations where the attorney is held not to be
acting for both despite appearances that he may be. In Beacom v.
Daley,77 the parties transferred property from one to another and
only one attorney was involved. The court, however, held that he
may not have been the attorney for both and that this was a question
of fact. If he were not the attorney for both, then confidentiality
would be applicable in regard to what the party who was his client
revealed. In Nelson v. Glidewell,78 the plaintiff called an attorney
at the request of a husband and wife, who allegedly made a contract
to execute mutual wills and then to devise the property to the plaintiff
upon the death of the survivor. The attorney spoke to the husband
and wife out of the presence of the plaintiff. Plaintiff sought to intro-
duce the attorney's testimony as to what transpired in that conference
on the ground that he was the mutual attorney. The court quite
properly held the communications confidential. Here the plaintiff
merely called the attorney. More significantly, they spoke to the
attorney privately, which indicated they desired it to be confidential
as against the plaintiff. They might have been inhibited if she had
been present, so the normal confidentiality is applicable. Similarly,
in Russell v. Second Nat'l Bank of Patterson,17 where the attorney
was not simultaneously acting for both parties and neither knew he
was acting for the other, it was held he was not the mutual attorney.
The lack of knowledge negatived the intention that what was told
should not be confidential against the other.
The "intention to keep the matter confidential from the other"
justifies the conclusion that what the insured or the insurer tells the
insurer's attorney is not intended to be confidential against the
other.8 0 The insured considers that he and the insurer "are in the
same boat"; that is, their interests in the transaction are the same.
Neither, then, is inhibited in what he tells the attorney for fear the
other may discover it; indeed, he will as freely transmit it to the
other and, as we have seen, communications to the insurer are con-
sidered communications to an attorney.' 8'
175 La Barge v. La Barge, 284 App. Div. 996, 135 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1954); Potter
v. Potter, 35 Wash. 2d 788, 215 P.2d 704 (1950).
176 Grosberg v. Grosberg, 269 Wis. 165, 68 N.V.2d 725 (1955).
177 164 Neb. 120, 81 NAv.2d 907 (1957).
178 155 Neb. 372, 51 NAv.2d 892 (1952).
179 136 NJ.L. 270, 55 A.2d 211 (E. & A. 1947).
180 See the discussion of this point in McCormick § 95.
181 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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In the area of mutual attorney, the cases are in accord with the
underlying rationale of confidentiality and the courts have been most
realistic in their approach.
4. Waiver
Since confidentiality is granted for the client's benefit, he may,
of course, choose to waive the protection attorney-client confiden-
tiality seeks to afford. It may be waived expressly or by failing to
assert confidentiality when testimony involving such a communica-
tion is introduced at a trial in which the client is a party. 8 2 It may be
waived by the client's guardian 8 3 or by the client's personal represent-
ative upon his decease. 8 4 It has also been urged that the client could
waive confidentiality by contract,"8 5 which is sound, since like any
interest, the client may dispose of it for consideration. If the client
does not desire such protection and has no objection to the matter
being disclosed, the rationale given for confidentiality is consistent
with this waiver.
It is the concept of implied waiver which is most troublesome
and which furnishes courts, which may be basically unsympathetic
to confidentiality, with an opportunity to severely restrict it. It is in
this area of implied waiver that the "immoral nature" of concealing
relevant evidence comes into focus. The two aspects of implied waiver
involve the giving of testimony and disclosure of the subject matter
of the communication to third persons.
The client does not waive confidentiality merely by taking the
stand.' But if he testifies to some matters and reveals what he
communicated to the attorney in part, the balance of the communica-
tion as to the same matter is deemed waived.8 7 This really relates to
the right of the opponent to cross-examine.88 Thus if the client ad-
mits he told the attorney he was going 65 miles-per-hour, he cannot
object on cross-examination if the defendant asks him if he did
not also tell the attorney it was in a 50-mile zone. This does not
mean that everything he told the attorney as to other matters, e.g.,
that his hospital bills were a certain amount of money, is waived, but
182 See, e.g., Balazinski v. Lebid, 34 N.J. 277, 168 A.2d 209 (1961).
183 See, e.g., Lietz v. Primcock, 84 Ariz. 273, 327 P.2d 288 (1958).
184 See, e.g., Scott v. Grinnell, 102 N.H. 490, 161 A.2d 179 (1960).
185 Model Code of Evidence rule 231; Uniform Rule of Evidence 37.
186 See, e.g., State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950).
187 See, e.g., Steen v. First Nat'l Bank, 298 Fed. 36 (8th Cir. 1924); Houser v.
Frank, 186 Kan. 455, 350 P.2d 801 (1960).
188 See the discussion of this point in 8 Wigmore § 2327, at 636.
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only that the defendant may cross-examine him as to what is neces-
sary to complete the story of what he did reveal.
As with the client, the attorney's taking the stand and testifying
should not constitute a waiver as to all matters revealed to him.
However, Dean Wigmore suggests and Professor McCormick agrees
that if the attorney testifies as to matters revealed to him by the
client, confidentiality is waived as to all matters communicated by
the client-even as to those unrelated to the attorney's testimony.18 9
Professor McCormick notes that there is authority both ways. 9 °
The rationale is that the attorney should not be both a witness and
an advocate, and the client's calling him as a witness constitutes a
waiver of confidentiality which attaches only to his role as an
advocate. But as far as the client is concerned, the attorney is still
his attorney. What he disclosed to him was disclosed in confidence.
Granted that ordinarily the attorney should not testify except as to
purely formal matters, 9 ' circumstances may make it necessary for
the attorney to testify-or perhaps he is just imprudent. In either
situation, it cannot be contended that the client intended to waive
confidentiality. In fairness to the opponent, he must be given the
right to cross-examine the attorney on the communication as to which
he testified. The result should be the same as where the client
testifies-the attorney can be cross-examined as to the matter he
revealed, but not as to other matters revealed to him in confidence.
Where the client' 92 or the attorney 13 has testified to the com-
munication in a past action, confidentiality is obviously waived as to
that matter in future actions. The intention to abandon confiden-
tiality has been demonstrated and it cannot be recalled in the future.
Some courts have been very unrealistic in cases which have
held that revelation of the subject matter to third parties constitutes
a waiver without considering whether the third party was such that
the client would assume it would be kept confidential. Both the Uni-
form Rules and the Model Code state that disclosure to anyone
constitutes a waiver. 19 4 The problem is the same as where a third
party is present during the making of the communication to the
attorney. If under the circumstances the client assumed that what he
189 Ibid. See also McCormick § 97.
190 McCormick § 97, at 198 n.13 and cases cited therein.
191 See Canon of Professional Ethics 19.
102 See, e.g., Agnew v. Superior Court, 156 Cal. App. 2d 838, 320 P.2d 158 (1958);
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 108 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1958).
193 See, e.g., Matison v. Matison, 95 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 227 App.
Div. 700, 97 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1950).
194 Model Code of Evidence rule 231; Uniform Rule of Evidence 37.
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said would be confidential, we have contended that confidentiality
should attach despite the presence of the third party. Again, we will
use the example of the spouse. Revealing the communication to the
spouse would not constitute a waiver because it could not be revealed
by the spouse. However, from the client's standpoint, he may assume
that revealing the communication to certain other persons will in
no way impair confidentiality; therefore, he does not intend that the
attorney shall not keep confidentiality.
In Solon v. Lichtenstein,195 the court blindly stated that dis-
closure to a third party constituted a waiver of attorney-client confi-
dentiality, as the client "did not regard the statements as confidential
upon repetition to the attorney." But the statements were made to a
lifelong friend and to his granddaughter! This would not seem to
support the conclusion that he did not intend them to be confidential
so far as the attorney was concerned. It was not as if he announced
them at a lodge meeting.
In State v. Loponio,9 6 on the other hand, the court found there
was no waiver, even though the party to whom the communication
was revealed was a complete stranger to the client. The basis was
that the client had to reveal the statement to the third party, which
was not inconsistent with an intent that it be kept confidential by
the attorney. The client was indicted for murder and desired to
communicate with an attorney, but could not write in English. He
dictated a letter to a fellow prisoner for transmittal to the attorney.
The court, drawing an analogy to the interpreter situation, concluded
that there was an intention to employ the attorney, so that what was
revealed to him should be confidential.
The most realistic approach was taken by the court in People v.
Kor,197 since there the court looked to the client's intention with regard
to confidentiality by the attorney irrespective of the fact that he re-
vealed the communication to others. It was contended that the com-
munication was not confidential because the defendant had previously
said the same things to police officers who were interrogating him.
A person may say things at that time out of fear. This does not mean
that he does not expect the same statements to be protected from
disclosure by his attorney. The court found that he regarded his
conversation with the attorney as confidential and observed:
It seems clear that Kor regarded his conference with his attorney
as confidential and that he did not intend that his attorney should
195 39 Cal. 2d 75, 244 P.2d 907 (1952).
196 85 N.J.L. 358, 88 At. 1045 (E.&.A. 1913).
197 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 277 P.2d 94 (1954).
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be a witness against him even to repeat any statements that Kor
had made to the officers. It cannot be said that, merely because
Kor's conversation with his attorney included statements previ-
ously made to officers, he did not regard his conversation with his
attorney as confidential and privileged. 98
The question then should be whether the communication to the third
person was made under such circumstances that, either due to the
relationship between the client and third person (in which he as-
sumed confidentiality) or the conditions or necessity for making such
statement to them, he did not intend that what he revealed to the
attorney should be disclosed.
A related problem involves communications made by a corpora-
tion through its officials to its attorney, which are also a matter of
corporate record. In Schaffer v. Below, 199 the court brushed aside the
contention that this constituted a waiver. The fact is that such
records are rarely inspected, even by stockholders, and thus do not
demonstrate an intent that the attorney should not keep the com-
munication confidential. If the matter has not been disclosed to any-
one outside the corporate confidence according to the corporate pro-
cedure, no intent that the attorney should not keep the matter confi-
dential should be inferred.0 0
To the extent that the court looks to the client's state of mind
when he revealed the matter to the attorney and his state of mind
when he revealed it to a third person, it is apt to arrive at a sound
result. If the circumstances were such that disclosure to the third
party would not be inconsistent with an intent to keep the matter
confidential as regards the attorney, the court should not find a
waiver.
5. Actions Involving Succession to Client's Property
It is stated as a general proposition that attorney-client confiden-
tiality is inapplicable in a suit to determine succession to the client's
property. Therefore, the attorney can be required to disclose all
matters relating to the property. The theories supporting such a
view are varied. One is that since all parties are claiming under the
decedent, none can invoke confidentiality against the other.2"' Another
198 Id. at 443, 277 P.2d at 9S.
199 278 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1960).
200 See the discussion of this point in Simon, "The Attorney-Client Privilege as
Applied to Corporations," 65 Yale L.. 953, 985 (1956).
201 See In re Breese's Estate, 7 Wis. 2d 422, 96 N.V.2d 712 (1959); Seeba v.
Bowden, 86 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1956); Gaines v. Gaines, 207 Okla. 619, 251 P.2d 1044
(1952); Forbes v. Volk, 358 P.2d 942 (Wyo. 1961). As to the effect of this on the
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view that has been expressed is that since the client has no interest
after his death, confidentiality belongs to his heirs and legatees, any
one of whom can waive it.2°2 Dean Wigmore suggests that confiden-
tiality was intended to be temporary only and, therefore, does not
survive the death of the client.203 Professor McCormick would extend
Wigmore's concept of temporary confidentiality to any situation
where the decedent's property is involved, even though the parties are
not claiming under him. Confidentiality, he states, is personal only.20 4
Dean Wigmore's analysis comes closest to the underlying ration-
ale of attorney-client confidentiality, but falls short when sought to
be extended to all situations involving such property, for, as will be
demonstrated, there are circumstances where the decedent intended
confidentiality to be applicable in post-mortem disputes over his
property.
As indicated previously, the attorney can testify to the execution
of a will where he is an attesting witness. This is not considered a
communication within the meaning of attorney-client confidentiality
as the attestation is made for the purpose of being revealed.2°3 He
may testify as to the client's intention and as to the construction of
the will.2 " Again, this is material the testator did not intend to be
confidential. The attorney is the person whom he would expect to aid
in the construction of the will; this might be an additional reason for
having the attorney draft the will rather than attempting a "do-it-
yourself" job. By the same token he may testify that the client de-
stroyed his will, a fact the client revealed to the attorney to lend
authenticity to the act of destruction.20 7
However,, it is conceivable that the decedent revealed matters to
the attorney that he did not wish disclosed even after his death,
relating to his property. Since, if he had known they would be
subject to disclosure, he might not have revealed them to the attorney,
the underlying rationale of attorney-client confidentiality would pre-
vent their disclosure even if all parties were claiming under the
representation of a claimant by the testator's attorney, see In re Kemp's Will, 236 N.C.
680, 73 S.E.2d 906 (1953); Cochran v. Cochran, 333 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
202 See Bradway v. Thompson, 139 Ark. 542, 214 S.W. 27 (1919); Platz, "The
Competency of Attorneys and Physicians to Disclose Privileged Communications in
Testamentary Cases," 1939 Wis. L. Rev. 339, 343 (1939).
203 8 Wigmore § 2314, at 612.
204 McCormick § 98.
205 And, therefore, is like any information intended to be revealed to third parties;
the client is not inhibited by assurances of confidentiality.
206 See, e.g., Stappas v. Stappas, 271 Ala. 138, 122 So. 2d 393 (1960); Webb v.
Webb, 116 Utah 155, 209 P.2d 201 (1949).
207 See, e.g., Saliba v. Saliba, 202 Ga. 791, 44 S.E.2d 744 (1947).
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decedent. This has been recognized in a case where all parties were
not claiming under the decedent. In De Loach v. Meyers,20 8 the
party seeking to call the attorney claimed she had an oral contract
with decedent to execute a will in her favor. It was held that what
the decedent told the attorney relating to such a contract was confi-
dential. If the decedent claimed there was no contract, his interest
would be adverse to that of the plaintiff. As in any other situation, he
consulted the attorney for legal advice and would not want what he
said disclosed by the lawyer. The fact that he was dead and the
suit involved succession to his property is irrelevant 2°9 when the
underlying rationale of attorney-client confidentiality is considered.
The same rationale may justify confidentiality even when all
parties to the dispute are claiming under the decedent. In In re
Karras's Estate,2 10 the attorney was not permitted to testify as to
communications made by the client to him in proceedings to probate
an alleged lost will of the decedent. There was no issue as to which it
was evident that the client would have desired the attorney to testify.
By not telling the attorney that he had a lost will (which fact he
wanted revealed), the client indicated that he wanted the attorney to
keep confidential all matters relating to his property. By the same
token it has been held that statements by the client as to the legiti-
macy of his daughter were not admissible in a suit to deny the child's
right to inherit.2 1 ' Her illegitimacy, if any, apparently was not a
fact he wanted revealed. This was equally true in a proceeding by the
executor to discover property allegedly held by the decedent's joint
tenant.212 There was no question of construction of the instrument or
the like, and the communication did not involve a matter that the
client would have clearly wanted revealed after his death.
As to the attorney's testifying to the decedent's mental capacity
or undue influence, the attorney should be permitted to testify that
the client was competent or that he was not under the influence of
another, but not the converse; that is, he can testify in favor of the
will's validity, but not against it. We have previously concluded that
208 215 Ga. 255, 109 S.E.2d 777 (1959).
209 See also In re Smith's Estate, 263 Wis. 441, 57 N.W.2d 727 (1953). There the
niece of the deceased husband was asserting a claim against the estate of the deceased
wife for property the wife received under the husband's will on the ground that he con-
tracted to leave such property to the niece. It was properly held that communications
by the wife to her attorney were to be confidential. Obviously, she assumed they would
not be revealed in a suit by persons against her estate.
210 109 Ohio App. 403, 166 N.E.2d 781 (1959).
211 In re Olson's Estate, 73 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
212 In re Duke's Will, 202 Misc. 446, 108 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
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the client's actions and the like by which the attorney arrives at a
judgment as to competency of the client constitute a communication
within the meaning of attorney-client confidentiality. Persons may be
inhibited in their statements if they think the attorney can draw a
conclusion that they are of unsound mind and reveal it. Moreover,
since some people are aware they may be considered "peculiar," they
might not consult an attorney to prepare a will for them if they did
not believe he could not reveal their "peculiarities."
Therefore, they did not intend for him to reveal these matters
after their death, as with any other communication. Many courts
permit the attorney to testify that the client was of sound mind or that
he was free from undue influence on the ground that confidentiality is
inapplicable after the client's death where all parties claim under
him. 13 The result is proper, since the client intended that the
attorney testify in favor of his competency. As stated previously, an
additional reason for going to an attorney is to lend his authenticity to
the client's mental state. The reasoning, however, is dangerous when
it is employed, as it was in In re Alexander's Will,2"4 to permit the
attorney to testify to the client's lack of competency. The qualifica-
tion that the testimony "not disgrace the memory of the deceased"
does not meet the objection that the decedent did not intend the attor-
ney to reveal his mental condition. A more realistic approach was
followed by the court in Taylor v. Sheldon."5 There the attorney was
summoned to prepare a will, but left without doing so. Presumably
he concluded the client was not competent. In a will contest, he was
not permitted to testify as to the decedent's mental capacity. The
court observed that the purpose of attorney-client confidentiality
was to permit complete freedom of disclosure and that "communi-
cation" meant "to make known." Here the client consulted the
attorney and made known to him various matters including his
mental condition, as could be observed from his statements and
acts. Since he was entitled to assume all these statements and acts
were subject to confidentiality, the attorney was not permitted to
disclose them, even though all parties were claiming under the client.
It must be remembered, therefore, that statements such as "confi-
dentiality was intended to exist only during the client's lifetime when
all persons are claiming under him" are erroneous and unsound. The
213 See, e.g., Canty v. Halpin, 294 Mo. 96, 242 S.W. 94 (1922); Olsson v. Pierson,
237 Iowa 1342, 25 N.W.2d 357 (1946); Warner v. Kerr, 216 Mich. 139, 184 N.W. 425
(1921); In re Kemp's Will, supra note 201; Boyd v. Kilmer, 285 Pa. 533, 132 Aft. 709
(1926).
214 205 Misc. 894, 130 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
215 172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961).
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intention was that the attorney should reveal all matters necessary to
carry out the desires of the client-the execution of a will, the com-
petency of the client, the destruction of a will and the like-but not
that he reveal matters the client did not want disclosed. The criterion
is the client's state of mind as to the particular communication, not
the circumstances in which the issue of attorney-client confidentiality
arises. It is immaterial that all parties are claiming under the client
if the communication involves a matter the client assumed the attorney
would not reveal.
6. Use by the Attorney
It is the general rule that confidentiality does not exist when there
is an issue as to the attorney's breach of duty."' This is applicable
where the client is suing the attorney, e.g., for a fee or for mal-
practice, 17 in disbarment proceedings against the attorney,21 or in
any situation where the attorney's proper performance of his duty is
brought into question, such as where a new attorney moves for a new
trial on grounds of the incompetency of the former attorney. 19
The reason is not that "it would be unjust to permit confiden-
tiality' 220 or that "confidentiality has been waived,"'221 but simply that
the client would not assume the attorney would not reveal what was
disclosed to him in order to defend himself. At the time of the com-
munication, the client does not expect controversy to arise between
him and the attorney, so he is not inhibited by the thought that the
attorney will reveal the communication. Moreover, if he was thinking
about this, he would realize that he must make the disclosures in
order to obtain advice and would have to take the risk of revelation
upon a subsequent dispute. Lack of confidentiality here can be ex-
plained as being consistent with the rationale of attorney-client
confidentiality.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have attempted to examine the rationale of
attorney-client confidentiality and once established, to comment on
the present state of the law in light of the criteria furnished by the
rationale. The rationale is that it is socially desirable with a view
216 Model Code of Evidence rule 213(b).
217 Have v. Baird, 12 Ind. 318 (1859).
218 State v. Markey, 259 Wis. 527, 49 N.V.2d 437 (1951).
219 Everett v. Everett, 319 Mich. 475, 29 N.W.2d 919 (1947). See Browning v.
Potter, 129 Colo. 477, 271 P.2d 418 (1954).
220 As stated in State v. Markey, supra note 218.
221 As stated in Everett v. Everett, supra note 219.
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toward effective functioning of attorney-client relationships to assure
the client of secrecy in his communications with the attorney. We
have concluded that people expect such secrecy and would be inhibited
if it were not assured-with resultant detriment to the furnishing of
proper legal advice. Therefore, all questions must be determined with
reference to whether permitting the disclosure of the particular com-
munication under the circumstances would tend to impair the effec-
tive functioning of the attorney-client relationship, as the client
would be inhibited from revealing vital matters to the attorney for
fear of disclosure by him.
We have deliberately, even slavishly, avoided the use of the
term, "attorney-client privilege." This is because we think it undesir-
able that the question be phrased in terms of a "privilege" for the
attorney to keep the confidences of his client. Rather, it is submitted
that all communications from client to attorney intended by the client
to be kept secret are entitled to confidentiality. If this results in the
exclusion of evidence-which can be proved by other means, though
this may require greater effort on the part of opposing counsel-then
this is a price we willingly pay for effective attorney-client relation-
ships. There are other values to be fostered than the admissibility
of every piece of relevant evidence. To the extent that the courts are
conscious of protecting attorney-client relationships, they should
examine the underlying rationale of confidentiality and employ sound
criteria to determine whether the admission of evidence is privileged
despite a claim of attorney-client confidentiality.
